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“The man who discovers a new scientific truth has previously had
to smash to atoms almost everything he had learnt, and arrives at
the new truth with hands bloodstained from the slaughter of a
thousand platitudes.” — Jose Oreta y Gasset, The Revolt of the
Masses ch. XIV (1930).

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that “[m]any defendants have been convicted and spent countless years in prison
based on evidence by arson experts who were later shown to be little better than
witch doctors.”1 In the same year, Dr. Jo Handelsman, a White House science
advisor, observed: “Suggesting that bite marks [should] still be a seriously used
technology is not based on science, on measurement, on something that has
standards, but more of a gut-level reaction.”2 According to Judge Catherine
Easterly of the D.C. Court of Appeals, “[a]s matters currently stand, a certainty
statement regarding toolmark pattern matching has the same probative value as
the vision of a psychic.”3 A New York Times editorial echoed these sentiments:
“And the courts have only made the problem worse by purporting to be
scientifically literate, and allowing in all kinds of evidence that would not make it
within shouting distance of a peer-reviewed journal. Of the 329 exonerations
based on DNA testing since 1989, more than one-quarter involved convictions
based on ‘pattern’ evidence — like hair samples, ballistics, tire tracks, and bite
marks — testified to by so-called experts.”4

1

Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, v
(2015). See also Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“There have been too many pseudo-scientific disciplines that have since been
exposed as profoundly flawed, unreliable, or baseless for any Court to take this [gate-keeping] role
lightly.”).
2
See Radley Balko, A High-Ranking Obama Official Just Called for the
“Eradication” of Bite Mark Evidence, WASH. POST, July 22, 2015 (quoting remarks presented at
the International Symposium on Forensic Science Error Management — Detection, Measurement
and Mitigation, Arlington, Virginia (July 20–24, 2015), organized by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)).
3
Williams v. United States, 130 A.3d 343, 355 (D.C. 2016) (Easterly, J.,
concurring).
4
Editorial, Junk Science at the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2015. See also Eric
S. Lander, Fix the Flaws in Forensic Science, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2015 (“No expert should be
permitted to testify without showing three things: a public database of patterns from many
representative samples; precise and objective criteria for declaring matches; and peer-reviewed
published studies that validate the methods.”).
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These criticisms are valid — which raises a puzzling and consequential
question: Why didn’t the Supreme Court’s “junk science” decision, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,5 prevent or restrict the admissibility of
testimony based on flawed forensic techniques? Daubert was decided in 1993,
nearly twenty-five years ago.
A.

Daubert/Rule 702

Daubert was considered a revolutionary decision.6 It “radically changed
the standard for admissibility of scientific testimony”7 by sweeping away the Frye
“general acceptance” test,8 which had been the majority rule in both federal and
state cases.9 The Frye standard gave great deference to the views of forensic
practitioners and not to empirical testing.10 Daubert promised to be different.
The Supreme Court held that “[p]roposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation — i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known. In short,
the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”11 In making this reliability
determination, the Daubert Court highlighted five factors: (1) testing, (2) peer
review and publication, (3) error rate, (4) maintenance of standards, and (5)
general acceptance. The first and most important factor is empirical testing. The
other factors are supplementary. Peer review and publication are designed to
expose defects in testing. Acceptance of a technique within the scientific
community is achieved through the publication of valid test results. Similarly,
both error rates and standards are derived from testing.
Daubert was followed in 1999 by Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,12 which held
that Daubert’s reliability standard applied to all expert testimony, not only
5

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339, 340
(2002) (“Daubert initiated a scientific revolution in the law.”).
7
United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000). See also United
States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert has become ubiquitous in
federal trial courts.”).
8
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (stating that a
technique “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs”).
9
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
10
See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1138 (1998) (“Frye does
not work because its measure of validity is the judgment of ‘the field,’ and the field may consist of
nonsense. For example, the Frye doctrine cannot exclude astrology.”).
11
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added).
12
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
6
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scientific evidence. By 2000, the Supreme Court was describing Daubert as
establishing an “exacting” standard.13 In the same year, Federal Rule of Evidence
702 was amended to incorporate the Daubert/Kumho standard.14 Although a
handful of jurisdictions continue to apply the Frye test, about forty jurisdictions
have adopted the Daubert standard in one form or another.15
During this time, there was no shortage of commentary on the lack of
empirical research in forensic science.16 For example, shortly after Daubert was
decided, Professor Margaret Berger wrote: “Considerable forensic evidence made
its way into the courtroom without empirical validation of the underlying theory
and/or its particular application.”17 After Kumho, two commentators — citing bite
mark, hair, and firearm analysis — observed that “little rigorous, systematic
research has been done to validate the discipline’s basic premises and techniques,
and in each area there was no evident reason why such research would be
infeasible.”18
Notwithstanding Daubert’s promise, scholars soon discerned its uneven

13

Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
After Daubert, the Court decided General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997), which established the standard for appellate review (abuse of discretion) for applying the
Daubert factors. Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho make up what is known as the Daubert Trilogy.
15
See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.06 (5th ed. 2012).
16
A few perceptive scholars had noted the lack of empirical testing prior to
Daubert. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 109, 137 (1991) (“Forensic science is supported by almost no research. The laboratory
practices are based on intuitions and deductions, not on empirical proof.”); D. Michael Risinger et
al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting
Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 738 (1989) (“Our literature search for
empirical evaluation of handwriting identification turned up one primitive and flawed validity
study from nearly 50 years ago, one 1973 paper that raises the issue of consistency among
examiners but presents only uncontrolled impressionistic and anecdotal information not qualifying
as data in any rigorous sense, and a summary of one study in a 1978 government report. Beyond
this, nothing.”); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can Teach
the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 372 (1991) (“[F]orensic
scientists, like scientists in all other fields, should subject their claims to methodologically rigorous
empirical tests. The results of these tests should be published and debated. Until such steps are
taken, the strong claims of forensic scientists must be regarded with far more caution than they
traditionally have been.”).
17
Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1354 (1994) (“Courts never required some of the most venerable branches of
forensic science — such as fingerprinting, ballistics, and handwriting — to demonstrate their
ability to make unique identifications.”).
18
Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tires, 14 CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Winter 2000, at
12, 40. For an insightful analysis of how identification science was accepted by the courts, see
Saks, supra note 10.
14
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application in civil and criminal cases: “[T]he heightened standards of
dependability imposed on expertise proffered in civil cases has continued to
expand, but . . . expertise proffered by the prosecution in criminal cases has been
largely insulated from any change in pre-Daubert standards or approach.”19 The
title of a 2005 article pretty much summed up the state of the law — “The (Near)
Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice.”20 In short, Daubert-lite.
B.

National Academy of Sciences Forensic Report (2009)

In 2006 Congress entered the picture by authorizing the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study of forensic science. After a three-year
investigation, NAS issued a landmark report. One of its most riveting passages
concluded: “Among existing forensic methods, only nuclear DNA analysis has
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree
of certainty, demonstrate a connection between an evidentiary sample and a
specific individual or source.”21 The report went on to state that “some forensic
science disciplines are supported by little rigorous systematic research to validate
the discipline’s basic premises and techniques.”22 Such common forensic
techniques as fingerprint examinations,23 firearms (ballistics) and toolmark
identifications,24 handwriting examinations,25 microscopic hair analysis,26 and bite

19

D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 149 (2000). In addition, an extensive
study of reported criminal cases found that “the Daubert decision did not impact on the admission
rates of expert testimony at either the trial or appellate court levels.” Jennifer Groscup et al., The
Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases,
8 PYSCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 364 (2002).
20
Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and
Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005).
21
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 100 (2009)
[hereinafter NAS FORENSIC REPORT].
22
Id. at 22. At another point, the report stated: “The simple reality is that the
interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific studies to determine its
validity. This is a serious problem.” Id. at 8. See also id. at 6 (“Often there are no standard
protocols governing forensic practice in a given discipline. And, even when protocols are in place
. . ., they often are vague and not enforced in any meaningful way.”).
23
Id. at 144 (Research is needed “[t]o properly underpin the process of friction
ridge [fingerprint] identification.”).
24
Id. at 154 (“Sufficient studies [on firearms identification] have not been done to
understand the reliability and repeatability of the methods.”).
25
Id. at 166 (“The scientific basis for handwriting comparisons needs to be
strengthened.”).
26
Id. at 161 (“[T]estimony linking microscopic hair analysis with particular
defendants is highly unreliable.”).
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mark comparisons27 fell into this category.
Not only did the NAS report highlight flaws in forensic science, it sharply
criticized the judiciary for failing to demand the validation that Daubert required:
“The bottom line is simple: In a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic
science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or
the accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in
addressing this problem.”28 In a later passage, the report declared that “Daubert
has done little to improve the use of forensic science evidence in criminal
cases.”29 The disparate treatment of civil actions and criminal prosecutions was
also noted. After finding that “trial judges rarely exclude or restrict expert
testimony offered by prosecutors,” the report commented: “[I]ronically, the
appellate courts appear to be more willing to second-guess trial court judgments
on the admissibility of purported scientific evidence in civil cases than in criminal
cases.”30
Despite the NAS report, courts generally continued to admit the same
evidence. Only a handful of courts applied the “exacting” standard that the
Supreme Court said Daubert demanded.31
***
This article examines the justice system’s failure by reviewing the status of
six forensic techniques: (1) bite mark analysis, (2) microscopic hair comparisons,
(3) firearms and toolmark identifications, (4) fingerprint examinations, (5) bullet
lead analysis, and (6) arson evidence. It argues that the system’s failure can be
traced back to its inability to demand and properly evaluate foundational research,
i.e., Daubert’s first factor (empirical testing). Indeed, the justice system may be
structurally incapable of applying Daubert in criminal cases.
A different paradigm is needed, one that assigns an independent agency
the responsibility of evaluating foundational research. As discussed in Part III,
this approach was recently recommended by the National Commission on

27

Id. at 174 (“No thorough study has been conducted of large populations to
establish the uniqueness of bite marks . . . .”).
28
Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
29
Id. at 106.
30
Id. at 11.
31
Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455. As former federal district judge Nancy Gertner
noted: “[A] busy trial judge can rely on the decades of case law to legitimize decisions rejecting a
hearing or motions in limine. And the trial judge can count on the Court of Appeals likely
concluding that rejecting the challenge was not an abuse of the judge’s discretion.” Nancy Gertner,
Commentary on the Need for A Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789,
790 (2011).
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Forensic Science (2013-17)32 and the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (2016) (PCAST).33 Both recommended that the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) evaluate all forensic disciplines on a
continuing basis, thereby injecting much needed scientific expertise into the
criminal justice system.
II. FORENSIC TECHNIQUES
A.

Bite Mark Comparisons

For decades, bite mark evidence has been admitted in hundreds of trials,34
many of which were capital prosecutions.35 No reported American case has
rejected bite mark testimony. Moreover, it is not uncommon for courts to speak
of bite mark comparison as a “science”36 — even an “exact science.”37
Acceptance of the technique is so deeply entrenched that some courts have taken
judicial notice of its validity,38 which means its reliability is indisputable.39
Distinctive characteristics of a person’s dentition were first used to identify

32

In 2013, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in partnership with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), established the National Commission on Forensic
Science to enhance the practice and improve the reliability of forensic science. The author served
on the Commission.
33
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT: FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE PCAST Report].
34
See 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 15, § 13.05 (discussing the admissibility of
bite mark evidence). In Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954), a bite mark was
left in a piece of cheese in a burglary case. Two decades later, in Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d
857, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), a prosecution expert matched the defendant’s teeth to a mark
found on a murder victim.
35
See Carrington Tucker, Mississippi Innocence: The Convictions and
Exonerations of Leven Brooks and Kennedy Brewer and the Failure of the American Promise, 28
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 123 (2015).
36
See People v. Marsh, 441 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (“the science of
bite mark analysis has been extensively reviewed in other jurisdictions”).
37
See State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (“an exact
science”).
38
See State v. Richards, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (Ariz. 1990) (“[B]ite mark evidence is
admissible without a preliminary determination of reliability . . ..”); People v. Middleton, 429
N.E.2d 100, 101 (N.Y. 1981) (“The reliability of bite mark evidence as a means of identification is
sufficiently established in the scientific community to make such evidence admissible in a criminal
case, without separately establishing scientific reliability in each case . . . .”); State v. Armstrong,
369 S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1988) (judicially noticing the reliability of bite mark evidence).
39
See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to a “fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute”).
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skeletonized remains and individuals in mass disasters such a plane crashes.40
Courts assumed that these distinctive characteristics can be transferred to another
person’s skin during a violent crime (e.g., homicides, rapes, and child abuse),41 an
assumption that overlooked some obvious problems. First, bite marks typically
involve no more than the edges of six to eight front teeth, not thirty-two teeth with
five anatomical surfaces that can be used when comparing a deceased person’s
dentition with X-rays. Second, bite marks do not reveal artifacts such as fillings,
crowns, etc., all of which assist in associating human remains with a person’s
dental records.42 Moreover, human skin is extremely malleable and thus subject
to various types of distortion.43 In addition, bite mark analysis is a subjective
technique with no agreed-upon methodology.
1. Foundational Research
Despite overwhelming judicial approval, bite mark evidence is not
supported by foundational research.44 Indeed, the only rigorous studies are recent

40

1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 15, at § 13.03 (discussing the admissibility of
dental identifications).
41
See People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“The concept
of identifying a suspect by matching his dentition to a bite mark found at the scene of a crime is a
logical extension of the accepted principle that each person’s dentition is unique.”); People v.
Smith, 443 N.Y.S.2d 551, 556-57 (Cty. Ct. 1981) (“The basic premise is the unique nature of
individual dentition … and the virtually infinite number of individual bite configurations.”).
42
“Restorations alone, with varying shapes, sizes, and restorative materials, may
offer numerous points for comparison. In addition to restorations, the number of teeth, prostheses,
decay, malposition, malrotation, peculiar shapes, root canal therapy, bone patterns, bite
relationship, and oral pathology may all provide identifying characteristics.” 1 GIANNELLI ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 711.
43
See I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark AnalysesA Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85, 87 (2001) (“Skin is a poor registration material since it is
highly variable in terms of anatomical location, underlying musculature or fat, curvature, and
looseness or adherence to underlying tissues. Skin is highly visco-elastic, which allows stretching
to occur during either the biting process or when evidence is collected.”).
One study classified different types of distortion: Primary distortion occurs at the time of
biting and results (1) from the dynamics of the biting process (dynamic distortion) and (2) from the
features of the tissue bitten (tissue distortion). Secondary distortion occurs at a subsequent time. It
can be subdivided into three categories. The first is time-related distortion, e.g., caused by
subsequent healing or decomposition. Posture distortion results when the bite mark is viewed or
recorded in a position that differs from the position at the time of biting. Photographic distortion
results from the angle of the camera and the curvature of the body. See D.R. Sheasby & D.G.
MacDonald, A Forensic Classification of Distortion in Human Bite Marks, 122 FORENSIC SCI.
INT’L 75 (2001).
44
See Saks, supra note 10, at 1120 (“[R]ather than the field convincing the courts
of the sufficiency of its knowledge and skills, admission by the courts apparently convinced the
forensic odontology community that, despite their doubts, they really were able to perform bite
mark identifications.”).
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— and undercut the technique’s validity.45 The 2009 NAS forensic report
concluded that “the scientific basis is insufficient to conclude that bite mark
comparisons can result in a conclusive match.”46 Despite the NAS report, courts
continued to permit expert testimony on the subject. For example, in State v.
Prade,47 decided in 2014, the expert testified that “bite mark evidence is generally
accepted within the scientific community.”48 Similarly, in Coronado v. State,49 a
different expert stated that he did not “agree with the NAS Report’s conclusion
that bite mark analysis cannot result in a conclusive match” — adding “you do not
have to be a ‘rocket scientist’ to see that, in some cases, there is a unique and
distinct pattern of teeth that can be identified.”50 In addition, these experts
rejected the valid research mentioned above51 and both prosecutors and their

45

Dr. Mary Bush and her colleagues at the Laboratory for Forensic Odontology,
State University of New York at Buffalo, have published over a dozen studies that have
undermined the assumptions underpinning bite mark evidence. See, e.g., Mary Bush et al.,
Statistical Evidence for the Similarity of the Human Dentition, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 118, 122
(2011) (“Our results show that given our measurement parameters, statements concerning dental
uniqueness with respect to bitemark analysis in an open population are unsupportable. . . .
Confidence in the notion of dental uniqueness in bitemark analysis has been based on anecdotal
knowledge, the use of inappropriate statistics, and precedence of admission in the courtroom.”);
Mary Bush et al., Biomechanical Factors in Human Dermal Bitemarks in a Cadaver Model, 54 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 167 (2009) (23 bites were made in cadaver skin with the same dentition using an
instrumented-biting machine. The cadavers were moved and re-photographed in different
positions. Subsequent measurements showed differences between all bite marks. In addition,
postural distortion was significant).
One survey of fifteen odontologists involved their opinions of six images of supposed bite
marks. The “practitioner agreement was at best fair, with wide-ranging opinions on the origin,
circumstance, and characteristics of the wound given for all six images.” M. Page et al., Expert
Interpretation of Bitemark Injuries — A Contemporary Qualitative Study, 58 J. FORENSIC SCI. 664,
664 (2013).
46
NAS FORENSIC REPORT, supra note 21, at 175.
47
9 N.E.3d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
48
Id. at 1097.
49
384 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012).
50
Id. at 926.
51
See Prade, 9 N.E.3d at 1098 (“As to Dr. Bush’s cadaver studies, Dr. Wright
testified that cadaver skin simply cannot compare with living skin. Dr. Wright explained that
cadaver skin only distorts after a bite for two to three minutes at most because, unlike live skin, no
bruising, contusions, or lacerations occur. Dr. Wright also testified that using a mechanical jaw to
bite is problematic because the jaw operates on a fixed hinge that cannot mimic the wider range of
movement that an actual jaw is capable of.”). But see I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, A Paradigm Shift in
the Analysis of Bitemarks, 201 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 38, 40 (2010) (cadaver models have
limitations but “there is little alternative for researchers to produce bitemarks of known origin”;
use of anesthetized pigs to create peri-mortem injuries raises a different issue — i.e., differences
between pigskin and human skin).
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experts attacked researchers without offering any foundational research.52
Unfortunately, the American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO) has
fiercely defended bite mark analysis. To bolster its position, the ABFO conducted
a study that was presented at a forensic conference in 2015.53 As it turned out, the
study undercut the ABFO’s own position. Thirty-nine ABFO-certified bite mark
experts — with an average of twenty years experience — examined 100 bite mark
photographs. Each was asked three questions:
(1) Is there sufficient evidence in the presented materials to render an
opinion on whether the patterned injury is a human bite mark?
(2) Is it a human bite mark, not a human bite mark, or suggestive of a
human bite mark?
(3) Does the bite mark have distinct, identifiable arches and individual
tooth marks?
The results to the first question were not reassuring. The thirty-nine experts
agreed unanimously in only four out of the 100 cases. In only twenty cases was
there 90 or more percent agreement. At the end of question two — whether the
mark is a human bite mark — there were only sixteen cases with 90 or more
percent agreement. At the end of the third question, there were only eight cases in
which at least 90 percent of the analysts agreed.54 Equally disturbing was the
ABFO’s decision to postpone publishing the results “until the organization can
tweak the design of the study and conduct it again, a process that’s expected to
take at least a year.”55 In effect, a do-over. Meanwhile, an Associated Press
analysis reported that at least twenty-four men convicted or charged with murder
or rape based on bite marks have been exonerated since 2000.56
2. Texas Forensic Science Commission (2016)
Steven Chaney spent twenty-eight years in prison for murder based largely

52

See Radley Balko, In Angry, Defensive Memo, Manhattan DA’s Office
Withdraws Bite Mark Evidence, WASH. POST., Jan. 13, 2016; Radley Balko, Attack of the Bite
Mark Matchers, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2015; Radley Balko, The Path Forward on Bite Mark
Matching — and the Rearview Mirror, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2015.
53
The study is known as Construct Validity Bitemark Assessments Using the
ABFO Bitemark Decision Tree (“Freeman/Pretty Study”).
54
Radley Balko, A Bite Mark Matching Advocacy Group Just Conducted a Study
that Discredits Bite Mark Evidence, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2015.
55
Id.
56
See Chaney v. State, 775 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. App. 1989) (A board-certified
forensic odontologist “concluded that, in his opinion and with reasonable dental certainty,
appellant made the bite marks on Sweek's body.”).
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on bite mark evidence. When he was eventually exonerated via DNA testing,57 the
Innocence Project filed a complaint on his behalf with the Texas Forensic Science
Commission (TFSC).58 In 2016, after a six-month investigation, the TFSC
recommended a moratorium on the admission of bite mark testimony. It found
that there is no scientific basis for claiming that a particular mark can be
associated to a person’s dentition: “Any testimony describing human dentition as
‘like a fingerprint’ or incorporating similar analogies lacks scientific support.”59
Similarly, “there is no scientific basis for assigning probability or statistical
weight to an association, regardless of whether such probability or weight is
expressed numerically (e.g., 1 in a million) or using some form of verbal scale
(e.g., highly likely/unlikely).”60
TFSC was also alarmed that the ABFO study was not published due to
“political and organizational pressures.” In the commission’s view, “such a
resistance to publish scientific data contradicts the ethical and professional
obligations of the profession as a whole, and is especially disconcerting when one
considers the life and liberty interests at stake in criminal cases.”61
3. White House PCAST Report (2016)
In September 2016, the White House released its report on forensic
science.62 Regarding bite mark analysis, it concluded that (1) appropriately
designed validation studies are lacking, (2) the few available studies had “very
high” false-positive rates, (3) “inappropriate closed-set designs . . . are likely to
underestimate the true false positive rate,” and (4) the studies show that experts
“cannot even consistently agree on whether an injury is a human bitemark.”63

57

Amanda Lee Myers, Once Key in Some Cases, Bite-mark Evidence Now Derided
as Unreliable, Associated Press, Jun. 16, 2013.
58
Texas created the Texas Forensic Science Commission (TFSC) in 2005 after a
scandal required Houston to close its crime lab. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 38.01(4)(a)(3)
(2005) (among other duties, the Commission should “investigate, in a timely manner, any
allegation of professional negligence or misconduct that would substantially affect the integrity of
the results of a forensic analysis conducted by an accredited laboratory, facility, or entity”). See
generally Michael Hall, False Impressions, TEXAS MONTHLY, Jan. 2016.
59
TEXAS FORENSIC SCI. COMM’N, FORENSIC BITEMARK COMPARISON COMPLAINT
FILED BY NATIONAL INNOCENCE PROJECT ON BEHALF OF STEVEN MARK CHANEY—FINAL REPORT
11-12 (2016).
60
Id. at 12.
61
Id. at 13. See also Brandi Grissom, Arguments Over Bitemarks Get Testy at
Texas Forensic Science Commission Meeting, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 2015.
62
WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 9.
63
“PCAST finds that bitemark analysis is far from meeting the scientific standards
for foundational validity.” Id.
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Numerous cases support the last observation.64
***
In sum, the courts have yet to reject bite mark evidence — a subjective
method that is not supported by foundational research and lacks agreed-upon
standards.65 “Perhaps no discredited forensic assay has benefitted more from
criminal courts’ abdication of gatekeeper responsibilities than bite mark
analysis.”66 Instead, it was the Innocence Project that spearheaded the challenges
in this area, and in 2016 the Texas Forensic Science Commission became the first
governmental body to seriously scrutinize the technique. Notwithstanding the
NAS, PCAST, and TFSC reports, courts continue to admit bite mark evidence.67
Incredibly, at the April 11, 2017 meeting of the National Commission on Forensic
Science the chairman of the National District Attorneys Association stated that
his organization believes that bite mark evidence is a “reliable science.”68 A day
earlier, Keith Harward described how bite mark evidence resulted in thirty-three
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See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 878 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“[T]he
defense attempted to rebut Dr. Warnick’s testimony with the testimony of other experts who
opined that the mark on the victim’s cheek was the result of livor mortis and was not a bite mark at
all.”); Czapleski v. Woodward, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12567 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1991) (dentist’s
initial report concluded that “bite” marks found on child were consistent with dental impressions of
mother; several experts later established that the marks on child’s body were postmortem abrasion
marks and not bite marks); Kinney v. State, 868 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Ark. 1994) (disagreement that
marks were human bite marks); People v. Noguera, 842 P.2d 1160, 1165 n.1 (Cal. 1992) (“At trial,
extensive testimony by forensic odontologists was presented by both sides, pro and con, as to
whether the wounds were human bite marks and, if so, when they were inflicted.”); State v.
Duncan, 802 So. 2d 533, 553 (La. 2001) (“Both defense experts testified that these marks on the
victim’s body were not bite marks.”); Stubbs v. State, 845 So. 2d 656, 668 (Miss. 2003) (“Dr.
Galvez denied the impressions found on Williams were the results of bite marks.”).
65
See Michael J. Saks et al., The Impending Death of Forensic Bitemark
Identification, 3 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 1 (2016) (“[R]ecent reviews of the field’s claims, as well as
recent empirical findings, have underscored the lack of reliability and validity of the most
fundamental claims about the ability of forensic dentists to identify the source of bitemarks on
human skin.”).
66
M. Chris Fabricant & William Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm:
Forensic Science’s Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 38 (2016).
67
In Commonwealth v. Ross, No. CR 2038-2004, at 5 (C.P. Blair County, Pa.,
Mar. 8, 2017), the court admitted bite mark evidence, albeit limited, noting that “[t]he
Commonwealth notes that no state or federal court has suppressed expert testimony in a criminal
case based upon the NAS Report, and no courts have prohibited bite mark evidence based upon the
PCAST or TFSC reports.” See also Radley Balko, Incredibly, Prosecutors are Still Defending
Bite Mark Evidence, WASH. POST, Jan 30, 2017.
68
Pem Levy, Sessions’ New Forensic Science Adviser Has a History of Opposing
Pro-Science Reforms, MOTHER JONES, Aug. 10, 2017.
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years of imprisonment before being exonerated by DNA evidence.69
B.

Microscopic Hair Analysis

In this examination, samples are first examined to identify features visible
to the naked eye such as color and form, i.e., whether it is straight, wavy, or
curved. Next, the sample is viewed microscopically to determine characteristics
such as shaft form, hair diameter, and pigment size.
Experts have long acknowledged that a positive identification is not
possible with microscopic hair analysis. Instead, examiners testify that a crime
scene exemplar was “consistent with” a hair sample from the defendant. The
probative value of this conclusion would, of course, vary if only a hundred people
had microscopically indistinguishable hair as opposed to several million. Due to a
lack of research, no one knows whether the crime scene hair could have come
from 10 other persons or 100, 10,000, and so forth.70 This important qualifying
information was often omitted from the experts’ testimony, thus making marginal
evidence appear misleadingly convincing.71
However, experts frequently went way beyond the “consistent with”
language in their testimony, suggesting a rare association. For example, in the
Edward Honaker case, the expert testified that the crime scene hair sample “was
unlikely to match anyone” other than the defendant.72 Honaker spent ten years in

69

See Frank Green, DNA Proves Man Innocent of 1982 Rape and Murder in
Famous ‘Bite-mark’ Case, Lawyers Say, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH , Mar. 12, 2016 (Keith
Harward case); Spencer S. Hsu, Va. Exoneration Underscores Mounting Challenges to Bite-Mark
Evidence, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2016 (Keith Harward case).
70
As one hair examiner wrote: “If a pubic hair from the scene of a crime is found
to be similar to those from a known source, [the courts] do not know whether the chances that it
could have originated from another source are one in two or one in a billion.” B.D. Gaudette,
Probabilities and Human Pubic Hair Comparisons, 21 J. FORENSIC SCI. 514, 514 (1976).
71
Professor Berger explained the problem:
We allow eyewitnesses to testify that the person fleeing the scene wore a yellow jacket
and permit proof that a defendant owned a yellow jacket without establishing the
background rate of yellow jackets in the community. Jurors understand, however, that
others than the accused own yellow jackets. When experts testify about samples matching
in every respect, the jurors may be oblivious to the probability concerns if no background
rate is offered, or may be unduly prejudiced or confused if the probability of a match is
confused with the probability of guilt, or if a background rate is offered that does not have
an adequate scientific foundation.
Berger, supra note 17, at 1357.
72
EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 58 (1996).
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prison before DNA proved him innocent.73 In another case, an expert testified that
hair samples were “consistent microscopically” but then elaborated: “In other
words, hairs are not an absolute identification, but they either came from this
individual or there is — could be another individual somewhere in the world that
would have the same characteristics to their hair.”74 This is an implicit (and
extreme) probability statement that lacks any empirical support.
Although microscopic hair analysis had long been judicially accepted,75
its validity was suspect.76 In 1995, a federal district court in Williamson v.
Reynolds observed: “Although the hair expert may have followed procedures
accepted in the community of hair experts, the human hair comparison results in
this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable.”77 The court also noted that
the “expert did not explain which of the ‘approximately’ 25 characteristics were
consistent, any standards for determining whether the samples were consistent,
how many persons could be expected to share this same combination of
characteristics, or how he arrived at his conclusions.”78 Williamson, who was five
days from execution when he obtained habeas relief, was subsequently exonerated
by DNA testing.79
The Williamson opinion — perhaps the only thorough judicial analysis of
microscopic hair comparisons — was all but ignored by other courts. In Johnson
v. Commonwealth80 (1999), the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the admissibility
of hair evidence, taking “judicial notice” of its reliability81 and thus implicitly
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Id.
Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okl. 1995) (emphasis
added), rev’d on this issue sub nom., Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that due process, not Daubert, controls in federal habeas review).
75
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against the
Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 41, 62 (1982) (stating that
“[t]he massive body of case law, liberally admitting even hair evidence of low probative value,
dwarfs the handful of cases excluding hair evidence”).
76
See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison
Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of
validating hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should be
excluded altogether from criminal trials.”).
77
Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1558.
78
Id. at 1554.
79
See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 146 (2000) (noting that the hair evidence
was shown to be “patently unreliable”). See also JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER
AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN (2006) (examining Williamson’s trial).
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12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999).
81
Id. at 267.
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finding its validity indisputable.82 Other courts echoed Johnson, not Williamson.83
Indeed, ten years after Williamson was decided, a 2005 decision by the
Connecticut Supreme Court observed (correctly) that “[t]he overwhelming
majority of courts have deemed such evidence admissible.”84
Once again, the courts abdicated their responsibility. Indeed, hair
evidence only began to be carefully scrutinized after a startling number of DNA
exonerations were reported.85 A 2008 study of 200 DNA exonerations found that
expert testimony (55 percent) was the second leading type of evidence — after
eyewitness identifications (79 percent) — used in wrongful conviction cases.86 A
subsequent investigation of trial transcripts underscored the role of hair analysis in
the exoneration cases: “Of the 65 cases involving microscopic hair comparison in
which transcripts were located, 25 cases, or 38%, had invalid forensic science
testimony.”87 The 2009 NAS report observed that “testimony linking microscopic
hair analysis with particular defendants is highly unreliable.”88
1. FBI Hair Review
In May 2013, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, rejected
Willie Jerome Manning’s request for a stay of execution to permit DNA testing —
“potentially setting up what experts said would be a rare case in recent years in
which a person is put to death with such requests unmet.”89 A week later, the
court unexpectedly stayed Manning’s execution — after the Department of Justice
(DOJ) notified state officials that FBI experts had presented misleading testimony
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See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to a “fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute”).
83
See 2 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 15, § 24.03, at 825 (noting the “limited
impact of Daubert”).
84
State v. West, 877 A.2d 787, 808 (Conn. 2005).
85
In 1998, a Canadian judicial inquiry into the wrongful conviction of Guy Paul
Morin was released. Morin’s original conviction was based, in part, on hair evidence. The judge
conducting the inquiry recommended that “[t]rial judges should undertake a more critical analysis
of the admissibility of hair comparison evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt.” HON. FRED
KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN (Ontario Ministry of
the Attorney General 1998) (Recommendation 2). See also EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note
72, 58 (listing cases).
86
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 81 (2008).
87
Brandon L. Garrett & Peter Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2009).
88
NAS FORENSIC REPORT, supra note 21, at 161.
89
Campell Robertson, Mississippi Inmate’s Bid for DNA Tests Is Denied With
Tuesday Execution Set, N.Y. T IMES, May 4, 2013, at A11.
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at his trial, including hair and firearms evidence.90
Soon after, the DOJ announced that Manning was but one of 120 cases —
including twenty-seven death penalty prosecutions — in which improper
microscopic hair analysis had been introduced in evidence.91 For example,
examiners claimed to connect a hair sample to a single person “to the exclusion of
all others” or stated or suggested a probability for such a match from past
casework.92 The FBI review came after three District of Columbia men, who had
been convicted of rape or murder in the early 1980s, were exonerated through
DNA testing.93 In one of these cases, the FBI expert testified: “Chances that it
came from someone else were ‘one in 10 million.’”94
After further investigation, DOJ reported in 2015 that “FBI examiners had
provided scientifically invalid testimony in more than 95 percent of cases where
that testimony was used to inculpate a defendant at trial.”95 Commonwealth v.
Perrott96 was one of the first cases to reach the courtroom as a consequence of the
DOJ review. A superior court granted Perrott a new trial in 2016, criticizing the
misleading use of hair evidence. The court noted: “In discussing the
‘microscopic characteristics’ of hair, [the expert] stated that these characteristics
‘make that hair somewhat unique.’ He likened the ‘subtle’ characteristics of hair
that ‘make it somewhat unique’ to the subtle differences in a human face.”97

90

See Campell Robertson, With Hours Left to Go, Execution Is Postponed, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2013 (noting that the Department of Justice “disavow[ed] the degree of certainty
expressed by F.B.I. forensic experts at the man’s trial”). See also Andrew Cohen, A Ghost of
Mississippi: The Willie Manning Capital Case, THE ATLANTIC, May 2, 2013.
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See Jack Nicas, Flawed Evidence Under a Microscope: Disputed Forensic
Techniques Draw Fresh Scrutiny; FBI Says It Is Reviewing Thousands of Convictions, WALL ST.
J., July 18, 2013.
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Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Reviewing 27 Death Penalty Convictions for FBI Forensic
Testimony Errors, WASH. POST, July 17, 2013 (“[O]n the witness stand, several agents for years
went beyond the science and testified that their hair analysis was a near-certain match.”).
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See Editorial, Failures at the FBI Crime Lab, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2012 (“Kirk
L. Odom was incarcerated for 20 years and Donald E. Gates for nearly 30 for crimes they did not
commit. Santae A. Tribble spent 28 years behind bars, even though DNA evidence now shows he
almost undoubtedly was not the culprit.”).
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Martin Enserink, Evidence on Trial, 351 SCIENCE 1129, 1129, Mar. 11, 2016.
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WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33 at 3. See also Editorial, Junk
Science at the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2015 (“a sweeping post-conviction review of 2,500
cases”); Hugh B. Kaplan, DOJ Examiners Gave Bad Testimony in 90 Percent of Hair Comparison
Cases, BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 77, Apr. 22, 2015.
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Nos. 85–5415, 5416, 5418, 5420, 5425, 2016 WL 380123 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Jan. 26, 2016).
97
Id. at *32. The expert also “asserted that the hairs ‘matched’ and showed a
‘strong association.’ In discussing the chance that the hair found on the victim’s bed came from
someone other than Perrot, [the expert] conceded the possibility, adding that during his ten years
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2. White House PCAST Report (2016)
In June 2016, the Department of Justice released proposed guidelines
concerning hair testimony. Documentation purporting to support the validity and
reliability of hair evidence accompanied the guidelines.98 Listing several studies,
the FBI concluded:
Based on these and other published studies, microscopic hair
comparison has been demonstrated to be a valid and reliable scientific
methodology. These studies have also shown that microscopic hair
comparisons alone cannot lead to personal identification and it is crucial
that this limitation be conveyed both in the written report and in
testimony.99
The White House PCAST report, however, challenged the supporting
documentation, which discussed only a handful of studies from the 1970s and
1980s but did not comment on subsequent studies that found “substantial flaws in
the methodology and results of the key papers.”100 Moreover, “PCAST’s own
review of the cited papers [found] that these studies do not establish the
foundational validity and reliability of hair analysis.”101
***
The bottom line, again, is the judiciary’s dereliction in failing to curb the
misuse of hair microscopy testimony. The Innocence Project’s track record of
DNA exonerations brought this issue to the fore. Indeed, the three exonerations in
the District of Columbia triggered the FBI review. Yet, DOJ’s proposed

of experience ‘it’s extremely rare that I will have known hair samples from two different people
that I can’t tell apart.’ [The expert] made these statements of confidence, despite being unable to
recall at trial the length or diameter of the one hair found on the bed.” Id.
98
Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Issues Draft Guidance Regarding
Expert Testimony and Lab Reports in Forensic Science, June 3, 2016. These documents are
known as the Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-draft-guidance-regarding.
99
Supporting Documentation for Department of Justice Proposed Uniform
Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Hair Examination Discipline at 4.
www.justice.gov/dag/file/877741/download.
100
WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 13.
101
Id. DOJ’s supporting documents cited M.M. Houck & B. Budowle, Correlation
of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 964 (2002). This
FBI study used mitochondrial DNA analysis to re-examine samples from previous FBI
microscopic hair examination cases. The PCAST report did not accept that this study supported
validity and reliability because the study showed that in 9 of 80 cases (11 percent) the microscopic
examination found the hair indistinguishable but DNA analysis showed that the hairs came from
different individuals.
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guidelines were based on “foundational research” that PCAST questioned.
C.

Firearms & Toolmark Identifications

Firearms identifications, popularly known as “ballistics,” is another longestablished forensic discipline. It developed in the early part of the last century,
and by the 1930s courts were admitting evidence based on this technique.
Subsequent cases followed these precedents, admitting evidence of bullet,
cartridge case, and shot shell identifications.102 Toolmark comparison, a related
discipline, was also accepted during this period.103 At the time Daubert was
decided, the FBI’s position was clear: “Firearms identification is the Forensic
Science discipline that identifies a bullet, cartridge case or other ammunition
component as having been fired by a particular firearm to the exclusion of all
other firearms.”104 Yet, the examination, by means of a comparison microscope,
is subjective and without a meaningful standard.
1. Post-Daubert Cases
The courts gave short shrift to the initial post-Daubert challenges to
firearms and toolmark identifications.105 In 2005, however, the legal landscape
changed abruptly. In United States v. Green,106 the district judge questioned the
foundational basis of firearms identifications. The court wrote that the expert
“declared that this match could be made ‘to the exclusion of every other firearm in
the world.’ . . . . That conclusion, needless to say, is extraordinary, particularly
given [his] data and methods.”107 Moreover, the expert could not cite any reliable
error rates and admitted that he relied mainly on his subjective judgment. In
addition, “[t]here were no reference materials of any specificity, no national or
even local database on which he relied. And although he relied on his past
experience with these weapons, he had no notes or pictures memorializing his past
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1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 15, § 14.06.
Id. at § 14.12.
104
FBI HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 57 (rev. ed. 1994) (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that
“the matching of spent shell casings to the weapon that fired them has been a recognized method of
ballistics testing in this circuit for decades”); United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 n.1
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years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification.”);
United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The Court has not found a
single case in this Circuit that would suggest that the entire field of ballistics identification is
unreliable.”).
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405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
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Id. at 107.
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observations.”108 In the end, the court restricted the expert’s testimony; he could
only explain the ways in which the casings were similar but not that they came
from a specific weapon “to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.” In
the court’s view, that conclusion “stretches well beyond [the expert’s] data and
methodology.”109 The court also cautioned: “The more courts admit this type of
toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, proficiency testing, or
evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices will endure; we should require
more.”110
A few weeks later, a different district judge in United States v. Monteiro111
found that the technique “is largely a subjective determination [and] based on
experience and expertise.”112 Importantly, the court also concluded that the theory
on which the expert relied was “tautological.” The Association of Firearm and
Toolmark Examiners (AFTE), the leading organization of examiners, proposed
the theory.113 Under this theory, the examiner may declare an identification if (1)
there is “sufficient agreement” of marks between the crime scene and test bullets
and (2) there is “sufficient agreement” when the examiner says there is.114 In
short, the “sufficient agreement” threshold is “in the minds eye of the examiner
and is based largely on training and experience.”115 The court would not admit the
evidence unless the expert could better document the examination.
Together, Green and Monteiro should have served as a shot across the
bow. But they did not; courts continued to admit the same evidence as before.116
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Id. at 109.
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407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006).
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Id. at 355.
113
See Theory of Identification, Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners,
30 AFTE J. 86 (1998).
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See Itiel E. Dror, How Can Francis Bacon Help Forensic Science? The Four
Idols of Human, 50 JURIMETRICS 93, 104 (2009) (“The potential problem here is the nonscientific
nature of the identification criteria. If the comparison of toolmarks enables conclusions about
common origin when the unique surface contours of two toolmarks are in ‘sufficient agreement,’
what is the scientific definition and measurement of what constitutes such ‘sufficient agreement’?
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Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
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See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161-162 (2d Cir. 2007)
(upholding admissibility of firearms identification evidence-bullets and cartridge casings); United
States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (“According to his testimony, these
toolmarks were sufficiently similar to allow him to identify Defendant’s gun as the gun that fired
the cartridge found at the crime scene. He opined that he held this opinion to a 100% degree of
certainty . . . . The Court also finds [expert’s] opinions reliable and based upon a scientifically
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2. NAS Ballistic Imaging Report (2008)
In 2008, the National Academy of Sciences published a report on
computer imaging of bullets.117 Although firearms identification was not the
primary focus of the investigation, a section of the report commented on the
subject.118 After surveying the literature on uniqueness, reproducibility, and
permanence of individual characteristics, the report noted that “[m]ost of these
studies are limited in scale and have been conducted by firearms examiners (and
examiners in training) in state and local law enforcement laboratories as adjuncts
to their regular casework.”119 The report found that the “validity of the
fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related
toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated.”120 The report went on to caution:
Conclusions drawn in firearms identification should not be made to imply
the presence of a firm statistical basis when none has been demonstrated.
Specifically, . . . examiners tend to cast their assessments in bold
absolutes, commonly asserting that a match can be made “to the exclusion
of all other firearms in the world.” Such comments cloak an inherently
subjective assessment of a match with an extreme probability statement
that has no firm grounding and unrealistically implies an error rate of
zero.121
Citing this report, the district court in United States v. Glynn122 ruled that
the expert would only be permitted to testify that it was “more likely than not”
that recovered bullets and cartridge cases came from a particular weapon.123 The
court also commented: “Based on the Daubert hearings . . . , the Court very

valid methodology. Evidence was presented at the hearing that the toolmark testing methodology
he employed has been tested, has been subjected to peer review, has an ascertainable error rate,
and is generally accepted in the scientific community.”).
117
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BALLISTIC
IMAGING (2008).
118
The committee was asked to assess the feasibility, accuracy, reliability, and
technical capability of developing and using a national ballistic database as an aid to criminal
investigations. It concluded: (1) “A national reference ballistic image database of all new and
imported guns is not advisable at this time.” (2) The National Integrated Ballistics Information
Network (NIBIN) “can and should be made more effective through operational and technological
improvements.” Id.
119
Id. at 70.
120
Id. at 81. The report also stated: “Additional general research on the uniqueness
and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks would have to be done if the basic premises of
firearms identification are to be put on a more solid scientific footing.” Id. at 82.
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Id. at 82.
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578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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quickly concluded that whatever else ballistics identification analysis could be
called, it could not fairly be called ‘science,’”124 further noting that “[t]he problem
is compounded by the tendency of ballistics experts … to make assertions that
their matches are certain beyond all doubt, that the error rate of their methodology
is ‘zero,’ and other such pretensions.”125
3. NAS Forensic Science Report (2009)
As noted earlier, NAS issued its forensic report the following year in 2009.
That report summarized the state of the research as follows:
Because not enough is known about the variabilities among individual
tools and guns, we are not able to specify how many points of similarity
are necessary for a given level of confidence in the result. Sufficient
studies have not been done to understand the reliability and repeatability of
the methods. . . . Individual patterns from manufacture or from wear
might, in some cases, be distinctive enough to suggest one particular
source, but additional studies should be performed to make the process of
individualization more precise and repeatable.126
In a different passage, the report — citing firearm and toolmark identifications —
observed that “[m]uch forensic evidence . . . is introduced in criminal trials
without any meaningful scientific validation, determination of error rates, or
reliability testing to explain the limits of the discipline.”127
AFTE rejected these findings out of hand, arguing that NAS “ignore[d]
extensive research supporting the scientific underpinnings of the identification of
firearm and toolmark evidence.”128 The court in United States v. Otero129 accepted
the AFTE’s position, citing studies which it was ill-equipped to evaluate.130 A
subsequent review of the oft-cited studies by two scientists concluded:
Exaggerated and unfounded implications relating to rates of error inferred
124
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from even the best of existing experiments in the field of
firearms/toolmarks, generally self-described as ‘validation studies’,
typically result from statistical, metallurgical and/or psychological
(cognitive) deficiencies in the design and conduct of the experiments, and
frequently lead to unjustified inferential extrapolation to universal
assumption for the practice domain.131
Other courts took an important, but still limited, step of restricting
examiner testimony by precluding the expert from making gross overstatements
such as declaring a match to the exclusion, either practical or absolute, of all other
weapons.132 Similarly, some courts forbade experts from testifying that they hold
their opinions to a “reasonable degree of scientific certitude.”133 That term has
long been required by courts in many jurisdictions for the admission of expert
testimony. Incredibly, the phrase has no scientific meaning and the claim of
certainty is unsupported by empirical research. Thus, it is grossly misleading.
Indeed, the National Commission on Forensic Science rejected it.134 Still other
courts went off on a quixotic tangent, substituting the phrase “reasonable degree
of ballistic” certitude.135 Changing “scientific certainty” to “ballistic certainty”
merely underscores the courts’ scientific incompetence.
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However, even these modest limitations were rejected by other courts.136
For example, in United States v. Casey,137 the district court declined “to follow
sister courts who have limited expert testimony based upon the 2008 and 2009
NAS reports and, instead, remains faithful to the long-standing tradition of
allowing the unfettered testimony of qualified ballistics experts.”138
4. White House PCAST Report (2016)
The 2016 White House PCAST report agreed with the NAS 2009 report’s
characterization of the scientific research on firearms and toolmarks
identification: “We find that many of these earlier studies were inappropriately
designed to assess foundational validity and estimate reliability. Indeed, there is
internal evidence among the studies themselves indicating that many previous
studies underestimated the false positive rate by at least 100-fold.”139 In addition,
PCAST found only one of the post-2009 studies sufficiently rigorous. The
Defense Department’s Forensic Science Center commissioned the study, which
was conducted by an independent testing lab (the Ames Laboratory, a Department
of Energy national laboratory affiliated with Iowa State University). In this study,
“[t]he false-positive rate was estimated at 1 in 66, with a confidence bound
indicating that the rate could be as high as 1 in 46.”140 The study has not been
published in a scientific journal. According to the PCAST report, more than one
study is required and studies should be published in peer-reviewed scientific
literature. Consequently, “the current evidence still falls short of the scientific
criteria for foundational validity.”141

136

See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 1 A.3d 572, 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2010)
(“[N]otwithstanding the current debate on the issue, courts have consistently found the traditional
method [of firearms identification] to be generally accepted within the scientific community, and to
be reliable.”); People v. Givens, 912 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (“This Court was unable
to find any cases where firearms and toolmark identification was found to be unreliable or no
longer scientifically acceptable.”).
137
928 F. Supp. 2d 397, 400 (D. Puerto Rico 2013).
138
Id. at 400. See also United States v. Sebbern, No. 10 Cr. 87(SLT), 2012 WL
5989813 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012); State v. Langlois, 2 N.E.3d 936, ¶ 41 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)
(“Our conclusion on this issue finds support in the decisions of other appellate districts in Ohio,
notwithstanding the recent criticisms in scientific reports and the limitations some federal courts
have imposed on the testimony of firearms experts. These decisions hold that the methodology of
comparatively analyzing and testing bullets and shell cases recovered from crime scenes is
reliable.”); State v. Jones, 303 P.3d 1084, ¶ 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (expert testimony
comparing bunter marks on the base of shell casings found at the crime scene to shell casings
found in Jones’s home admissible under Frye standard).
139
WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 11.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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The AFTE quickly retorted, expressing their “disappointment in the
PCAST’s choice to ignore the research that has been conducted” and claiming that
“[d]ecades of validation and proficiency studies have demonstrated that firearm
and toolmark identification is scientifically valid.”142 However, when PCAST
later invited stakeholders to submit validation studies that it may have overlooked,
no studies satisfying PCAST’s criteria were offered.143
***
The lessons here are familiar. For years, an entrenched forensic discipline
vigorously guarded its turf by rejecting the conclusions of the outside scientific
community.144 It published a journal which was “peer-reviewed” by other
members of its discipline. The journal, which is advertised as “the Scientific
Journal” of AFTE, was not generally available until 2016. The discipline claimed
to be a “science” but did not hold itself to the normative standards of science. The
AFTE “Theory of Identification” is “clearly not a scientific theory, which the
National Academy of Sciences has defined as ‘a comprehensive explanation of
some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence. . . . .’ More
importantly, the stated method is circular.”145 Only recently, after two NAS
reports, have some courts begun to limit misleading testimony. Many have not.
Thus, the courts’ competence to deal with flawed research remains extant.146 The
one bright spot came in Williams v. United States,147 in which Judge Easterly
wrote in a concurring opinion: “As matters currently stand, a certainty statement
regarding toolmark pattern matching has the same probative value as the vision of
a psychic: it reflects nothing more than the individual’s foundationless faith in
what he believes to be true.”148
D.

Fingerprint Examinations

142

Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners Response to PCAST Report
on Forensic Science, 48 AFTE J. 195, 195 (2016).
143
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AN
ADDENDUM TO THE PCAST REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS, Jan. 6, 2017, at 7
(“Several respondents wrote to PCAST concerning firearms analysis. None cited additional
appropriately designed black-box studies similar to the recent Ames Laboratory study.”).
144
See William A. Tobin et al., Absence of Statistical and Scientific Ethos: The
Common Denominator in Deficient Forensic Practices, 3 STATISTICS & PUBLIC POLICY (Dec. 16,
2016) (“[P]ractitioners remain intractable even after years of critical scholarly papers, ad hoc
committees of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), position statements from the U.S.
Department of Justice . . ..”).
145
WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 6.
146
Tobin et al., supra note 144 (“the purported ‘validation studies’ typically
proffered to courts are seriously flawed [and] have no external validity”).
147
130 A.3d 343 (D.C. 2016).
148
Id. at 355 (concurring).
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Before DNA analysis, fingerprint identification was the gold standard in
forensics.149 Like many other forensic disciplines, it gained judicial acceptance
decades before Daubert was decided. People v. Jennings,150 the first reported
fingerprint case, was decided in 1911. In 1984, the FBI pronounced the technique
“infallible” in its official publication, which also referred to the technique as a
“science.”151 Nevertheless, it is a subjective technique without an objective
standard and typically involves partial prints with inevitable distortions.
1. Post-Daubert Cases
After Daubert, challenges to fingerprint comparison testimony were
decidedly unsuccessful.152 One infamous case, United States v. Havvard,153
illustrates the judiciary’s lack of rigor in applying Daubert. Not only did the
district court uphold the admissibility of fingerprint testimony, it described the
technique as “the very archetype of reliable expert testimony under [the
Daubert/Kumho] standards.”154 According to the court, latent print identification
had been “tested” for nearly 100 years in adversarial proceedings with the highest
possible stakes — liberty and sometimes life. Yet, Daubert required scientific,
not “adversarial,” testing.155 Next, in citing “peer review,” the court noted that a
second fingerprint examiner also compared the prints: “In fact, peer review is the
standard operating procedure among latent print examiners.”156 This statement
reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of “peer review” as used in Daubert. In
that case, peer review meant refereed scientific journals in which validation
research is published. An amici brief submitted in Daubert by the New England
Journal of Medicine and other scientific publications explained that peer review’s
“role is to promote the publication of well-conceived articles so that the most

149

See Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science:
Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 654 (2007) (“The scientific integrity and
reliability of DNA testing have helped DNA replace fingerprinting and made DNA evidence the
new ‘gold standard’ of forensic evidence.”).
150
96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). See generally 1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 15, ch.
18 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with fingerprint identification).
151
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS iv (1984).
152
See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“Fingerprint evidence and analysis is generally accepted.”); United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d
984, 991 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D. Puerto
Rico 2001).
153
117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
154
Id. at 855.
155
See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 170 (2005)
(The “argument that no latent print has ever been found to match the rolled print of a different
person is . . . misleading because no systematic search for such pairs on the entire databank of
millions of fingerprints has ever been performed.”).
156
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
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important review, the consideration of the reported results by the scientific
community, may occur after publication.”157
Moreover, the court accepted the prosecution expert’s astounding claim
that the “error rate for the method is zero.”158 Experts argued that, while
individual examiners may make mistakes, the method itself is perfect. However,
the dichotomy between “methodological” and “human” error rates in this context
is “practically meaningless”159 because the examiner is the method.160 Finally, the
court turned Daubert on its head by requiring the defendant to prove the evidence
was unreliable, a distortion that would be employed in later cases.161
Then, United States v. Llera Plaza162 “sent shock waves through the
community of fingerprint analysts.”163 In that 2002 case, Judge Pollak ruled that
fingerprint experts would not be permitted to testify that two sets of prints
“matched” — that is, a positive identification to the exclusion of all other
persons. This was apparently the first time in over 90 years that such a decision
had been rendered.164 On rehearing, however, Judge Pollak reversed himself,165
157

Brief of the New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American Medical
Association, and Annals of Internal Medicine as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), at 3.
158
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
159
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 13, 60 (2001). Professor Mnookin goes on to provide this analogy: “The same
argument could be made of eyewitness testimony, a notoriously unreliable form of evidence.
People are all distinct from one another in observable ways; therefore the theoretical error rate of
eyewitness identification is zero, though in practice observers may frequently makes errors.” Id.
See also Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1040 (2005) (stating that “in fingerprint
practice the concept is vacuous”).
160
See Zabell, supra note 155, at 172 (“But, given its unavoidable subjective
component, in latent print examination people are the process.”).
161
See Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science
(Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1173-76 (2003)
(discussing the reversal of the burden of persuasion as one of several judicial responses employed
to avoid confronting the lack of empirical testing).
162
179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa.), vacated, mot. granted on recons., 188 F. Supp.
2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
163
See D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza,
21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2003).
164
As Professor Mnookin has noted, however, “fingerprints were accepted as an
evidentiary tool without a great deal of scrutiny or skepticism.” Mnookin, supra note 159, at 17.
She elaborated: “Even if no two people had identical sets of fingerprints, this did not establish that
no two people could have a single identical print, much less an identical part of a print. These are
necessarily matters of probability, but neither the court in Jennings nor subsequent judges ever
required that fingerprinting identification be placed on a secure statistical foundation.” Id. at 19.
165
188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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and later cases continued to uphold the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.166
Nevertheless, the case captured the attention of the media with news reports,167
mainstream publications,168 scientific journals,169 and televison shows giving it
substantial coverage.170 A spate of legal articles followed,171 with some
commentators believing that Llera Plaza I was more faithful to Daubert than
Llera Plaza II.172 In response, the FBI adopted a “circle the wagons” attitude,
fiercely defending the technique. The head of the FBI fingerprint section told 60
Minutes that the error rate was “zero”, examiners only testify to “hundred percent
certainty,” and the FBI had won “forty-one out of forty-one” legal challenges to
fingerprint evidence.173
The appellate opinion most faithful to Daubert appeared in United States
v. Crisp174 — unfortunately in dissent. The majority opinion upheld the
admissibility of fingerprint evidence by shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant and by grandfathering the technique.175 In dissent, Judge Michael
166

See, e.g., United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We
agree with the decisions of our sister circuits and hold that the fingerprint evidence admitted in this
case satisfied Daubert.”); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding
fingerprint evidence reliable); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004); United
States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704
(E.D. Ky. 2003).
167
E.g., Joann Loviglio, Trial Judge Reaffirms Fingerprint Usability; Hearing
Shows Him Science Involved, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002; Andy Newman,
Judge Who Ruled Out Matching Fingerprints Changes his Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002;
Richard Willing, Judge Challenges Fingerprint Identification, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2002.
168
E.g., Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie? The Gold Standard of Forensic
Science is Now Being Challenged, 78 THE NEW YORKER 96 (May 27, 2002) (discussing case
including interview with judge).
169
See David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339, 340
(2002).
170
60 Minutes: Fingerprints (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 2003).
171
See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004); Robert
Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 605 (2002); Kristin Romandetti, Note, Recognizing and Responding to a Problem with the
Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 45 JURIMETRICS 41 (2004).
172
E.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 ISSUES IN SCI.
& TECH. 47 (2003) (“Judge Pollak’s first opinion [restricting latent fingerprint individualization
testimony] was the better one.”); Recent Case, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2349, 2352 (2002) (“Fingerprint
expert testimony does not survive application of the Daubert factors . . ..”).
173
60 Minutes: Fingerprints (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 2003).
174
324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003).
175
Id. at 269 (“Put simply, Crisp has provided us no reason today to believe that
this general acceptance of the principles underlying fingerprint identification has, for decades,
been misplaced. Accordingly, the district court was well within its discretion in accepting at face
value the consensus of the expert and judicial communities that the fingerprint identification
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conscientiously applied the Daubert factors. First, he noted that the “government
did not offer any record of testing on the reliability of fingerprint identification. . .
. [T]here have not been any studies to establish how likely it is that partial prints
taken from a crime scene will be a match for only one set of fingerprints in the
world.”176 Second, as for peer review, “[a]gain, the government offered no
evidence on this factor at trial. Fingerprint examiners, . . . have their own
professional publications. . . . But unlike typical scientific journals, the
fingerprint publications do not run articles that include or prompt critique or
reanalysis by other scientists. Indeed, few of the articles address the principles of
fingerprint analysis and identification at all . . ..”177 Third, “an error rate must be
demonstrated by reliable scientific studies, not by assumption.”178 Fourth, “the
government did not establish that there are objective standards in the fingerprint
examination field to guide examiners in making their comparisons.”179 Fifth,
while acknowledging general acceptance in the fingerprint community, the judge
remarked that “[n]othing in the record in this case shows that the fingerprint
examination community has challenged itself sufficiently or has been challenged
in any real sense by outside scientists.”180
In conclusion, the judge wrote: “The government has had ten years to
comply with Daubert. It should not be given a pass in this case.”181
2. Madrid Train Bombing
Llera Plaza was soon eclipsed by a more sensational event — the FBI’s
misidentification of Brandon Mayfield as the source of the crime scene prints in
the terrorist train bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004.182 More than any other
event, the Mayfield affair exposed the myth of fingerprint infallibility. This

technique is reliable.”).
176
Id. at 273-74 (Michael, J., dissenting).
177
Id. at 274.
178
Id. The judge added: “In a 1995 test conducted by a commercial testing
service, less than half of the fingerprint examiners were able to identify correctly all of the matches
and eliminate the non-matches. On a similar test in 1998, less than sixty percent of the examiners
were able to make all identifications and eliminations. . . . An error rate that runs remarkably close
to chance can hardly be viewed as acceptable under Daubert.” Id. at 275.
179
Id. at 276.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 272.
182
See Sara Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 5, 2004, at A1 (Spanish authorities cleared Brandon Mayfield and matched the
fingerprints to an Algerian national); Flynn McRoberts & Maurice Possley, Report Blasts FBI
Lab: Peer Pressure Led to False ID of Madrid Fingerprint, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 2004, at 1.

28

debacle resulted in investigations by the FBI183 and the Inspector General (IG) of
the Department of Justice.184 One of the more troubling aspects of these reports
dealt with the culture in the laboratory. The FBI internal investigation found that
“[t]o disagree was not an expected response,”185 and the IG reported that “FBI
examiners did not attempt to determine the basis of the [Spanish National
Police’s] doubts before reiterating that they were ‘absolutely confident’ in the
identification on April 15, a full week before the FBI Laboratory met with the
SNP.”186
In addition to highlighting the lack of foundational research, these events
raised a host of other issues, including (1) the role of cognitive bias in subjective
techniques,187 (2) the lack of well-defined standards,188 (3) the failure to administer
rigorous proficiency tests,189 (4) the manipulation of research,190 and (5) other
183

See Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization
in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 707 (2004).
184
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF
THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, UNCLASSIFIED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
(2006) (“Having found as many as 10 points of unusual similarity, the FBI examiners began to
‘find’ additional features in [the print] that were not really there, but rather were suggested to the
examiners by features in the Mayfield prints.”).
185
Stacey, supra note 183, at 713.
186
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 184, at 10.
187
See Itiel E. Dror et el., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to
Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74 (2006) (reporting an experiment
that showed fingerprint examiners changed their opinions when provided with irrelevant
information); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Simon A. Cole, Letter, Contaminated Evidence, 304 SCIENCE
959 (May 14, 2004) (“[F]orensic scientists remain stubbornly unwilling to confront and control the
problem of bias, insisting that it can be overcome through sheer force of will and good
intentions.”); Stacey, supra note 185, at 713 (“confirmation bias”).
188
Examiners follow a procedure known as Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V). See Zabell, supra note 155, at 178 (“ACE-V is an acronym, not a
methodology. It is merely the common sense description of what anyone would do if they were
examining a latent and a candidate source print.”).
189
See Crisp, 324 F.3d at 274 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting) (“Proficiency
testing is typically based on a study of prints that are far superior to those usually retrieved from a
crime scene.”); Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 565 (noting that “the FBI examiners got very high
proficiency grades, but the tests they took did not. . . . [O]n the present record I conclude that the
proficiency tests are less demanding than they should be.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Editorial, A
Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2004 (“There are no
systematic proficiency tests to evaluate examiners’ skill. Those tests that exist are not routinely
used and are substandard.”).
190
See Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Forensic Science: Oxymoron?, 302 SCIENCE
1625 (2003) (discussing the cancellation of a National Academies project designed to examine
various forensic science techniques, including fingerprinting, because the Departments of Justice
and Defense insisted on a right of review that the Academy had refused to other grant sponsors);
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 238 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We are deeply discomforted by
Mitchell’s contention — supported by Dr. Rau’s account of events, though contradicted by other
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instances of misidentifications.191 The FBI did not undertake a serious review of
fingerprints until it was compelled to address the issue due to the negative
publicity surrounding the Mayfield misidentification. Even then, however, the
FBI still characterized the technique as “scientific.”192
The scientific community continued to note the lack of research,193 — and
the courts continued to ignore this fact.194 Indeed, in United States v. Baines,195
decided in 2009, the head of the FBI fingerprint section testified: “As to these
‘false positives’ . . . the FBI had ‘made, on average, about one erroneous
identification every 11 years.’ The total number of identifications made has been
about one million per year, . . . so that the known actual error rate was about one
per eleven million identifications.”196 Problematically, he merely assumed that all
the other identifications were correct, thus disqualifying his analysis. Perhaps the
witnesses — that a conspiracy within the Department of Justice intentionally delayed the release of
the solicitation until after Mitchell’s jury reached a verdict. Dr. Rau’s story, if true, would be a
damning indictment of the ethics of those involved.”). See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert
and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U.
ILLINOIS L. REV. 53 (discussing the manipulation of forensic science research, including
fingerprint research).
191
See Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005) (collecting 23 cases
involving mistakes). The misidentification cases include some that involved (1) verification by
one or more other examiners, (2) examiners certified by the International Association of
Identification, (3) procedures using a sixteen-point standard, and (4) defense experts who
corroborated misidentifications made by prosecution experts. Id. at 985; Reasonable Doubt: Can
We Trust Crime Labs?, CNN PRESENTS, Jan. 9, 2005 (discussing the misidentification of Ricki
Jackson, who spent two years in prison).
192
See Bruce Budowle et al., Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge
Comparisons as a Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations, 8
FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (Jan. 2006).
193
See Donald Kennedy & Richard A. Merrill, Assessing Forensic Science, 20
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 33 (Fall 2003) (“The increased use of DNA analysis, which has undergone
extensive validation, has thrown into relief the less firmly credentialed status of other forensic
science identification techniques (fingerprints, fiber analysis, hair analysis, ballistics, bite marks,
and tool marks). These have not undergone the type of extensive testing and verification that is the
hallmark of science elsewhere.”); Zabell, supra note 155, at 164 (“Although there is a substantial
literature on the uniqueness of fingerprints, it is surprising how little true scientific support for the
proposition exists.”).
194
See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 110 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The district
court did not abuse its discretion. Numerous courts have found expert testimony on fingerprint
identification based on the ACE-V method to be sufficiently reliable under Daubert.”); United
States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he fingerprint evidence admitted in
this case satisfied Daubert.”); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We
conclude the district court did not err in admitting the fingerprint expert’s testimony.”); United
States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004).
195
573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009).
196
Id. at 984.
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most troubling aspect of this testimony was the lack of self-awareness for a person
who claimed to be a scientist.197
3. NAS Forensic Science Report (2009)
Fingerprint examiners follow a procedure known as Analysis,
Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V). The 2009 NAS report
observed that since “the ACE-V method does not specify particular measurements
or a standard test protocol, . . . examiners must make subjective assessments
throughout.”198 Thus, the ACE-V method is too “broadly stated” to “qualify as a
validated method for this type of analysis.”199 The report added that “[t]he latent
print community in the United States has eschewed numerical scores and
corresponding thresholds” and consequently relies “on primarily subjective
criteria” in making the ultimate attribution decision.200 In making the decision, the
examiner must draw on his or her personal experience to evaluate such factors as
“inevitable variations in pressure,” but to date those factors have not been
“characterized, quantified, or compared.”201 In addition, the report gave short shift
to the zero-error-rate argument, finding that “claims that these analyses have zero
error rates are not scientifically plausible.”202 In conclusion, the report outlined an
agenda for the research it considered necessary “[t]o properly underpin the process
of friction ridge identification.”203
Several studies were published after the NAS report.204 The most
important was a FBI study published in 2011,205 which is discussed below.
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See WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 53 (“The fallacy is
obvious: the expert simply assumed without evidence that every error in casework had come to
light.”).
198
NAS FORENSIC REPORT, supra note 21, at 139.
199
Id. at 142.
200
Id. at 141.
201
Id. at 144. Moreover, examiners lack population frequency data to quantify how
rare or common a particular type of fingerprint characteristic is. Id. at 144.
202
Id. at 142. See also id. at 143 (“Some in the latent print community argue that
the method itself, if followed correctly … has a zero error rate. Clearly, this assertion is unrealistic
… . The method, and the performance of those who use it, are inextricably linked, and both
involve multiple sources of error (e.g., errors in executing the process steps, as well as errors in
human judgment.”).
203
Id. at 144.
204
See WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 91-95.
205
B.T. Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint
Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7733 (2011) (“To attempt to ensure that the non-mated
pairs were representative of the type of matches that might arise when police identify a suspect by
searching fingerprint databases, the known prints were selected by searching the latent prints
against the 58 million fingerprints in the [Automated Fingerprint Identification System] database
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4. White House PCAST Report (2016)
According to the White House PCAST report, “latent fingerprint analysis
is a foundationally valid subjective methodology”206 and the FBI “significantly
advanced the field” by conducting the black-box study. Nevertheless, the false
positive rate
is substantial and is likely to be higher than expected by many jurors based
on longstanding claims about the infallibility of fingerprint analysis. The
false-positive rate could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases based on the
FBI study and 1 error in 18 cases based on a study by another crime
laboratory. In reporting results of [a] latent-fingerprint examination, it is
important to state the false-positive rates based on properly designed
validation studies[.]207
Moreover, “testimony asserting any specific level of increased accuracy (beyond
that measured in the studies) due to blind independent verification would be
scientifically inappropriate, as speculation unsupported by empirical evidence.”208
***
Despite the ruckus created by Llera Plaza and the Mayfield fiasco,
examiner testimony has remained unchanged. Testimony such as “zero error
rates,” “matches to the exclusion of all other fingerprints,” and “100 percent
certainty” — which had been used for decades — has continued, while the
fingerprint community remain oblivious that such statements were scientifically
implausible.
On a positive note, the Mayfield incident did trigger the FBI’s black box
study, which was a significant achievement. Still, this study was released 100
years after the courts first admitted fingerprint evidence.209 The White House
PCAST report found it “distressing” that properly constructed validation studies
had only been conducted recently and only one study had been published in a

and selecting one of the closest matching hits.”).
206
WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 9-10.
207
Id. at 10.
208
Id. at 99.
209
See supra text accompanying note 150.

32

peer-reviewed journal.210 Daubert had little effect.211 It took a serendipitous event
— the Madrid train bombing — to compel the research.
E.

Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis

For over thirty years, FBI experts testified about Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis (CBLA), a technique that was first used in the investigation into
President Kennedy’s assassination.212 CBLA compares trace chemicals found in
bullets at crime scenes with ammunition found in the possession of a suspect.
This technique was used when firearms (“ballistics”) identification could not be
employed. FBI experts used various analytical techniques (first, neutron
activation analysis (NAA), and then inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission
spectrometry (ICP-AES)) to determine the concentrations of seven elements —
arsenic, antimony, tin, copper, bismuth, silver, and cadmium — in the bullet lead
alloy of both the crime-scene and suspect’s bullets. Statistical tests were then
used to compare the elements in each bullet and determine whether the fragments
and suspect’s bullets were “analytically indistinguishable” for each of the
elemental concentration means. Exactly what the phrase “analytically
indistinguishable” meant was the central issue — i.e., did such a finding mean that
the bullet fragments came from a small or large universe? Obviously, the
probative value of the test results would differ if only a hundred bullets had the
same chemical composition as opposed to several million bullets.
The published cases revealed disparate and often inconsistent interpretive
conclusions provided by FBI experts. In some, experts testified only that two
exhibits were “analytically indistinguishable.”213 In other cases, examiners
concluded that samples could have come from the same “source” or “batch.”214 In
still others, they stated that the samples came from the same source.215 The
testimony in numerous cases went much further and referred to a “box” of
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WHITE HOUSE PCAST REPORT, supra note 33, at 95.
Some courts did placed limitations on the testimony. See, e.g., Mitchell, 365
F.3d at 245-46 (“Testimony at the Daubert hearing indicated that some latent fingerprint
examiners insist that there is no error rate associated with their activities or that the examination
process is irreducibly subjective. This would be out-of-place under Rule 702.”); Commonwealth
v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 61 n.22 (Mass. 2010) (“opinions expressing absolute certainty about,
or the infallibility of, an ‘individualization’ of a print should be avoided”).
212
See generally Erik Randich & Patrick M. Grant, Proper Assessment of the JFK
Assassination Bullet Lead Evidence from Metallurgical and Statistical Perspectives, 51 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 717 (2006) (discussing the original analysis of the bullet fragments).
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See Wilkerson v. State, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (Md. 2001).
214
See State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Or. 1974).
215
See United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1996); People v.
Lane, 628 N.E.2d 682, 689-90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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ammunition (usually 50 loaded cartridges, sometimes 20). For example, two
specimens:
(1) Could have come from the same box,216
(2) Could have come from the same box or a box manufactured on the
same day,217
(3) Were consistent with their having come from the same box of
ammunition,218
(4) Probably came from the same box,219 or
(5) Must have come from the same box or from another box that would
have been made by the same company on the same day.220
Several other statements that differ appear in the published opinions. An
early case reported that the specimens “had come from the same batch of
ammunition: they had been made by the same manufacturer on the same day and
at the same hour.”221 One case reports the expert’s conclusion with a statistic.222
In another case, the expert used the expressions “such a finding is rare”223 and “a
very rare finding.”224 In still another case, the expert “opined that the same
company produced the bullets at the same time, using the same lead source.
Based upon Department of Justice records, she opined that an overseas company
called PMC produced the bullets around 1982.”225
216

See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Jones, 425
N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. 1981).
217
See State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994); People v. Johnson, 499
N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (Ill. 1986).
218
See State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534 (N.C. 1982).
219
See Bryan v. State, 935 P.2d 338, 360 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
220
See United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1996) (“An expert
testified that such a finding is rare and that the bullets must have come from the same box or from
another box that would have been made by the same company on the same day.”); Commonwealth
v. Daye, 587 N.E.2d 194, 207 (Mass. 1992); State v. King, 546 S.E.2d 575, 584 (N.C. 2001) (The
expert “opined that, based on her lead analysis, the bullets she examined either came from the
same box of cartridges or came from different boxes of the same caliber, manufactured at the same
time.”).
221
Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 224 (Alaska 1979) (emphasis added).
222
State v. Earhart, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
223
United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 666 (8th Cir. 1996).
224
Id. at 667.
225
People v. Villarta, No. H021354, 2002 WL 66887 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan, 17, 2002)
(murder). In later years, the testimony became more limited. A 2002 FBI publication states the
conclusion as follows: “Therefore, they likely originated from the same manufacturer’s source
(melt) of lead.” Charles A. Peters, The Basis for Compositional Bullet Lead Comparisons, 4
FORENSIC SCI. COMM. No. 3, at 5 (July 2002) (emphasis added). Testimony to the same effect has
also been proffered. Transcript of Record at 6, Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No. 00CR2727 (Ky.
Cir. Ct. Jefferson County Feb. 28, 2002) (trial testimony of Charles Peters, FBI examiner): “Well,
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1. NAS Bullet Lead Report (2004)
The technique was not seriously challenged until a retired FBI examiner,
William Tobin, began questioning the procedure in scientific and legal journals226
and in court testimony as well.227 As a result, the FBI asked the National
Academy of Sciences to review the technique. The 2004 NAS report undercut the
FBI testimony: “The available data do not support any statement that a crime
bullet came from a particular box of ammunition. In particular, references to
‘boxes’ of ammunition in any form should be avoided as misleading under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.”228 Perhaps the most disturbing case is State v.
Earhart,229 a capital murder case in which the CBLA evidence apparently played a
significant role.230 The transcript contains the following expert testimony: “We
can — from my 21 years experience of doing bullet lead analysis and doing
research on boxes of ammunition down though the years I can determine if bullets
came from the same box of ammunition . . ..”231 However, the NAS report found

bullets that are analytically indistinguishable likely come from the same molten lead sources of
lead, uh, as opposed to bullets that have different composition come from different, uh, melts of
lead.”
226
See Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43
(2003); Erik Randich et al., A Metallurgical Review of the Interpretation of Bullet Lead
Compositional Analysis, 127 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 174 (2002) (Tobin was a coauthor); William A.
Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative is Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis?, 17 CRIM.
JUSTICE 26 (Fall 2002).
227
E.g., Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2006); Clemons v.
State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1070, 1068 (Md. 2006); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 339-40 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 2005) (Tobin’s affidavit submitted).
228
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FORENSIC
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 6 (2004). The author served on the NAS
Committee.
229
823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“[The expert] concluded that the
likelihood that two .22 caliber bullets came from the same batch, based on all the .22 bullets made
in one year, is approximately .000025 percent, ‘give or take a zero.’ He subsequently
acknowledged, however, that the numbers which he used to reach the .000025 percent statistic
failed to take into account that there are different types of .22 caliber bullets made each year – .22,
.22 long, and .22 long rifle. [The expert] ultimately testified that there could be several hundred
thousand bullets per batch, but with some variation in the elemental composition within the
batch.”) (emphasis added).
230
See Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) (denying habeas
relief, the court noted: “Given the significant role the bullet evidence played in the prosecution’s
case, we shall therefore assume Earhart could have made a sufficient threshold showing that he
was entitled to a defense expert under Texas law.”).
231
Transcript of Record at 5248-49, State v. Earhart, No. 4064, Dist. Ct. Lee
County, 21st Judicial Dist., Texas (testimony of John Riley). See also id. at 5258 (“Well, bullets
that are — that have analytically indistinguishable compositions or compositions that are generally
similar typically are found within the same box of ammunition and that is the case that we have
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that the amount of bullets that can be produced from a melt “can range from the
equivalent of as few as 12,000 to as many as 35 million 40grain, .22 caliber long
rifle bullets.”232 Earhart was subsequently executed.233
2. Post-Report Developments
Much of the FBI testimony rested on a database, which the Bureau had
built up over the course of many years. Although the NAS committee frequently
asked for this data during its year-long investigation, the FBI did not turn over the
data until it was too late to include an analysis of the information in its report.234
The two statisticians who served on the NAS committee later wrote that their
subsequent inspection of the data “identified several peculiarities.”235 First, the
database was incomplete. The FBI claimed to have a “complete data file” of some
71,000+ measurements but only 64,869 were turned over. Moreover, only
measurements made by ICP-AES were included; a different analytical method,
NAA, had been used before 1997. Both techniques measured the same elements,
and therefore the results from either technique would have been suitable for
comparison. Further, the numbering system for the bullets was “highly
inconsistent and rather unexpected,” suggesting that some bullet measurements
had been deleted.236 Additionally, “a rough investigation of the measurement

here. Now, bullets that are the same composition can also be found in other boxes of ammunition,
but it’s most likely those boxes would have been manufactured at the same place on or about the
same date.”). But see testimony of Charles Peters, FBI examiner, Commonwealth v. Wilcox,
Kentucky, Feb. 28, 2002 (Daubert hearing: “We have never testified, to my knowledge, that that
bullet came from that box. We’d never say that. All we are testifying is that bullet, or that victim
fragment or something, the bullet, either came from that box or the many boxes that were produced
at the same time.” Transcript at 1-2) (emphasis added).
232
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 228, at 6.
233
See Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Database of Executions,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (search for “Earhart” under “Find Person”
search box) (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
234
See Cliff H. Spiegelman & Karen Kafadar, Data Integrity and the Scientific
Method: The Case for Bullet Lead Data as Forensic Evidence, 19:2 CHANCE 16, 22 (2006)
(“During the open sessions of the committee meetings, the FBI claimed to have a ‘complete data
file’ of some 71,000+ measurements. Following repeated requests from the Committee, the FBI
submitted at its last meeting a CD-ROM that contained two data files with a combined total of
64,869 bullet (not 71,000+) measurement records. . . . This data set could not be analyzed in time
for the release of the report . . ..”).
235
Id.
236
Id. (“[T]he numbering system of the bullets was highly inconsistent and rather
unexpected, e.g., the bullets from a suspect in a particular case might be numbered Q13A, Q13B,
Q13C, Q14A, Q14B, Q14C, . . ., leading one to wonder what happened to bullets Q01, Q02, . . . ,
Q12.”). Other illustrations of incomplete data were noted: “[W]hile most of the bullets indicated
3 measurements, about 30 bullets had six or more measurements.” Id. “[O]nly about 50% of the
bullets in this data set were identified as having come from one of the four major bullet
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error indicated many measurement errors that exceeded the FBI’s claimed
analytical precision of 2-5%.”237 Finally, “only 15% of the 1079 cases listed in
these two files had measurements from [National Institute of Standards and
Technology] . . . making it impossible to determine the frequency of ‘matches’”
in some cases.238 Accordingly, the “missing data and the inconsistent precisions”
undermined the Bureau’s public claims.239 These authors were puzzled by the
FBI’s failure to disclose data: “The scientific method is important for science
generally; forensic science is no exception. . . . [T]he evidence in this paper
suggest that, at least for [CBLA], forensic science failed in the requirement to
share the material, methods and data to reach conclusions with the scientific
community.”240
The FBI’s response to the NAS report was also disconcerting. The Bureau
quickly put out a press release, obscuring the report’s findings.241 The release
highlighted the committee’s conclusion that the FBI was using appropriate
instrumentation and suitable elements for comparison. Yet, these aspects of
CBLA were never seriously questioned. Rather, the interpretation of the data was
disputed. Only one sentence in the press release addressed this critical issue:
“Recommendations by the [NAS] include suggestions to improve the statistical
analysis, quality control procedures, as well as expert testimony.”242 The news
media read the report quite differently — e.g., “Study Shoots Holes in Bullet
Analysis By FBI,”243 “Report Finds Flaws,”244 “Panel Questions FBI Bullet
Analysis,”245 and “Report Questions the Reliability of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test.”246
The Bureau also included the following passage in the press release: “The

manufacturers in the United States (Cascade Cartridge, Inc.; Federal; Remington; Winchester); the
‘complete data file’ of 71,000 bullets may yield a higher proportion of bullets from these four
manufacturers.” Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 22-23.
241
Department of Justice, FBI News Release, Feb. 10, 2004.
242
Id.
243
Maurice Possley, Study Shoots Holes in Bullet Analysis By FBI, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Feb. 11, 2004, at 14.
244
Charles Pillar, Report Finds Flaws in FBI Bullet Analysis; Changes are
Proposed for the Technique Often Cited in Expert Testimony in Criminal Trials, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2004, at 12.
245
Randolph E. Schmid, Panel Questions FBI Bullet Analysis, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 10, 2004.
246
See also Eric Lichtblau, Report Questions the Reliability of an F.B.I. Ballistics
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at 22.
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basis of bullet lead compositional analysis is supported by approximately 50 peerreviewed articles found in scientific publications beginning in the early 1970's.
Published research and validation studies have continued to demonstrate the
usefulness of the measurements of trace elements within bullet lead.”247 In
contrast, the NAS report pointed out that there were “very few peer-reviewed
articles on homogeneity and the rate of false positive matches” and “outside
reviews have only recently been published.”248
Over a year later, the FBI discontinued CBLA testing249 and issued another
(and similar) press release. Once again, the release minimized the problems,
citing the following reason for its decision: “While the FBI Laboratory still firmly
supports the scientific foundation of bullet lead analysis, given the costs of
maintaining the equipment, the resources necessary to do the examination, and its
relative probative value, the FBI Laboratory has decided that it will no longer
conduct this exam.”250 Nevertheless, a month earlier, Dwight Adams, the
laboratory director, had written a private memorandum to the FBI Director
specifying different reasons for abandoning the technique, including the following
comments: (1) “We cannot afford to be misleading to a jury” and (2) “We plan to
discourage prosecutors from using our previous results in future cases.”251 Neither
concern was reflected in the press release.
In the wake of the NAS report, several state courts excluded CBLA
evidence.252 Surprisingly, the FBI supplied affidavits in several cases supporting
247

FBI News Release, supra note 243.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 228, at 100.
249
Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Abandons Disputed Test for Bullets From Crime Scene,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A12.
250
Department of Justice, FBI News Release, Sept. 1, 2005.
251
John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007,
at A1.
252
See Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006) (noting that
“[i]f the FBI Laboratory that produced the CBLA evidence now considers such evidence to be of
insufficient reliability to justify continuing to produce it, a finding by the trial court that the
evidence is both scientifically reliable and relevant would be clearly erroneous”); Clemons v.
State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1070, 1078 (Md. 2006) (“CBLA is not admissible under the Frye-Reed
standard because it is not generally accepted within the scientific community as valid and
reliable.”; “Based on the criticism of the processes and assumptions underlying CBLA, we
determine that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony based on CBLA because of the
lack of general acceptance of the process in the scientific community.”); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d
329, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005) (finding the technique was “based on erroneous scientific
foundations”).
But see Commonwealth v. Fisher, 870 A.2d 864, 871 (Pa. 2005) (“The CBLA evidence,
at best, established a possible connection between Appellant and the bullets recovered from the
victim’s body.”). See also United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Davis’s
trial counsel cannot be said to be ineffective for failing to challenge the FBI’s methodology on a
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prosecutors’ efforts to sustain convictions based on the technique. In one
affidavit, the FBI cited the NAS report but failed to mention that the report had
faulted the Bureau’s statistical methods. The chair of the NAS committee
criticized the affidavit because it did “not discuss the statistical bullet-matching
technique, which is key and probably the most significant scientific flaw found by
the committee.”253 The affidavit was also misleading because it estimated that the
maximum number of .22-caliber bullets in a batch of lead was 1.3 million, when
the NAS committee found that the number could be as high as 35 million.254
On November 18, 2007, 60 Minutes aired a segment on CBLA.255 In an
interview, the FBI lab director, now retired, acknowledged that testimony about
boxes was “misleading and inappropriate.”256 That broadcast, along with a
Washington Post investigation, questioned the FBI’s response to the NAS report.
The main problem was that only the FBI had records of all the cases in which its
experts had testified, and the Bureau had declined to disclose the names of those
cases.257 Instead, the Bureau relied on the NAS report, its own press releases, and
pro forma letters sent to prosecution and defense organizations to notify
defendants. This method of communication was grossly inadequate because the
letters neither highlighted the problem, nor its significance.258 A few days after
the 60 Minutes expose, Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, sent a letter to the FBI Director noting that the Bureau’s
letters gave “the false impression that these discredited tests had continuing
reliability.”259
***

basis that was not advanced by the scientific community at the time of trial.”).
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Solomon, supra note 243 (quoting Ken MacFadden).
254
Id.
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60 Minutes: Evidence of Injustice (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 18, 2007).
256
Id.
257
Solomon, supra note 251, at A1 (“Hundreds of defendants sitting in prisons
nationwide have been convicted with the help of an FBI forensic tool that was discarded more than
two years ago. But the FBI lab has yet to take steps to alert the affected defendants or courts, even
as the window for appealing convictions is closing . . ..”).
258
The Innocence Network and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers formed a task force and worked with the FBI to contact defense attorneys and convicts.
See Vesna Jaksic, Faulty Bullet-Test Cases Finding Way to Court, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 25, 2008
(“The task force is lining up pro bono commitments from several law firms to handle the cases.”).
259
John Solomon, Leahy Pursues Forensic-Test Answers; Attorney General Is Told
to Prepare For Senate Inquiry, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2007, at A2 (quoting). Leahy also wrote:
“The new revelations about bullet-lead analysis are just the latest examples of the Department’s
inadequate efforts to ensure that sound forensic testing is utilized to the maximum extent to find
the guilty rather than merely obtain a conviction. Punishing the innocent is wrong and allows the
guilty party to remain free.” Id.
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Here, the flaws are many: Lack of foundational research, failure to make a
database available to outside scientists, and ignoring the FBI’s own protocols by
presenting inconsistent and misleading testimony. Moreover, the reluctance to
confess error and take timely corrective action violated basic scientific norms.
After decades of use, a federal district court in 2003 excluded CBLA evidence
under the Daubert standard260 for the first time.
F.

Arson Investigations

For decades arson investigators came from the “old school” of
investigators — those who used intuition and a number of rules of thumb to
determine whether a fire was incendiary. Critics of this approach complained that
it lacked a scientific foundation. Rather, it was based on folklore that had been
passed down from generation to generation — without any empirical testing.261
As early as 1977, a government report noted that common arson indicators had
“received little or no scientific testing” and “[t]here appears to be no published
material in the scientific literature to substantiate their validity.”262 Through the
1980s, proponents of a science-based approach to arson investigations waged an
uphill battle, finally winning a major victory in 1992 when the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) published its Guide for Fire and Explosion
Investigations (NFPA 921).263
1. Willingham Case
Although NFPA 921 would subsequently become the bible in arson
investigations,264 it was published weeks after Cameron Todd Willingham was
convicted for the arson-murders of his young children. Willingham, who was
executed twelve years later, is the poster-boy for junk science in arson
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United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137, 2003 WL 22922197 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9,

2003).
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See JOHN J. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION ch. 8
(2006) (discussing myths of arson investigations).
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J.F. BOUDREAU ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ARSON AND ARSON INVESTIGATION: A SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT (1977).
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NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION
INVESTIGATION (1992) [NFPA 921]. The NFPA promotes fire prevention and safety. The most
recent edition of NFPA 921 was published in 2011.
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See United States v. Hebshie 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 111 n.39 (D. Mass. 2010)
(NFPA 921 “is widely accepted as the standard guide in the field of fire investigation.”); Thomas
M. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives Tales, and Ipse Dixit: Emerging Forensic
3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue?, 16 RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2010) (noting that
NFPA 921 has “become the de facto national standard for fire scene examination and analysis”).
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investigations.265
At trial Deputy Fire Marshall Vasquez testified that “[t]he fire tells a story.
I am just the interpreter. . . . And the fire does not lie. It tells me the truth.”266 He
told the jury that he had found twenty arson so-called “indicators” during his postfire investigation of Willingham’s house.267 One indicator was a low burning
fire.268 “All fire goes up,” Vasquez testified.269 Thus, burn patterns on the lower
walls and floor suggested that an accelerant was used.270 This common-sense
notion, however, has its limitations, especially when a fire occurs in a contained
area, such as a house with its windows shut. Due to buoyancy, a thermal plume
initially rises once a fire is ignited. As the fire continues, the plume reaches the
ceiling, which causes it to spread outward towards the walls. When it reaches the
walls, the combustion products press down from the ceiling creating an upper
level, which continues to increase in depth and temperature. Eventually thermal
radiation replaces convection as the principal method of heat transfer. At this
point, every combustible surface in the room will spontaneously burst into flames.
This transition phenomenon, known as the onset of “flashover,” can occur within
minutes. After flashover, the entire room is burning, including the lower walls
and floor. Flashover, according to one authority, is the point at which the fire
transitions from a “fire in a room” to a “room on fire.”271 At trial, prosecution
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See Frontline: Death by Fire (PBS television broadcast Oct. 19, 2010); David
Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sep. 7, 2009, at 63;
Michael Hall, False Impressions, TEX. MONTHLY, Jan. 2016, at 7 (“The 893-page report, released
in April 2011, was anticlimactic for people looking for proof that Texas had executed an innocent
man. ”); Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Texas Man Executed on Disproved Forensics: Fire that
Killed His 3 Children Could Have Been Accidental, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2004, at C1 (“Arson
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Transcript, State v. Willingham, No. 24240-CR (13th Dist., Tex. 1991), vol. XI,
at 244 [hereinafter Willingham transcript], aff’d, Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995).
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A second expert’s testimony essentially tracked Vasquez’s.
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Vasquez testified that there was “char burning, like, for example, this is the
bottom here. It’s burned down here at the bottom. That is an indicator in my investigation of an
origin of fire because it’s the lowest part of the fire.” Willingham transcript, supra note 266, vol.
XI, at 239. See also Willingham, 897 S.W.2d at 354 (“An expert witness for the State testified that
the floors, front threshold, and front concrete porch were burned, which only occurs when an
accelerant has been used to purposely burn these areas. This witness further testified that this
igniting of the floors and thresholds is typically employed to impede firemen in their rescue
attempts.”).
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Willingham transcript, supra note 266, vol. XI, at 232.
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“So when I found that the floor is hotter than the ceiling, that’s backwards,
upside down. It shouldn’t be like that. The only reason that the floor is hotter is because there was
an accelerant.” Id. at 256.
271
LENTINI, supra note 261, at 68-70.
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witnesses acknowledged that there was an explosion.272 Consequently, a low
burning fire is not necessarily indicative of an incendiary origin.
Moreover, some of Vasquez’s other “indicators” — splotchy looking areas
that he called “puddle configurations” and “pour patterns” — are present after
flashover in an accidental fire.273 Similarly, additional indicators, such as
alligatoring (large shiny charred blisters on burned wood), are also explained by
flashover. This phenomenon also accounts for another fact that Vasquez thought
incriminatory. Willingham told investigators that he had attempted to save his
daughters, but the heat was too great and he was forced to run from the house
without shoes. Willingham’s feet were not burned, and in Vasquez’s mind, the
burn debris on the floor made that impossible.274 However, if Willingham left his
home before flashover, his feet would not have been burned.
Charring under an aluminum threshold of an interior door provided still
another clue. Here, again, this may occur in a flashover. Other perceived
indicators — melted bed springs,275 multiple points of origins,276 and brown stains
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See Willingham transcript, supra note 266, vol. XI, at 75 (“The windows, the
electricity started crackling and popping, and the top of the well — well, I was facing the side of
the house, and it just blew out. The flames just blew out. . . . All the windows and the front room
was engulfed.”) (testimony of Dianne Barbe); id. at 96 (“We was running towards the house, me
and my mother, we was fixing to go and try to get in, and that’s when it was an explosion.”)
(testimony of Dianne Barbe). Vasquez mentioned flashover in his testimony (id. vol. XII, at 4748), but he does not appear to understand its implications.
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According to Vasquez, a burn trailer was etched on the floor. Willingham
transcript, supra note 266, vol. XI, at 244 (“You can see that on the burnt patterns on this puddle
configuration on Exhibit No. 36. This is a strong indicator of a liquid.”).
274
“There was fire on the floor. . . . He had no injuries on his feet.” Id. at 267.
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“[T]he springs were burned from underneath. This indicates there was a fire
under this bed because of the burn underneath the bed.” Id. at 241.
276
“Multiple areas of origin indicate — especially if there is no connecting path,
that they were intentionally set by human hands.” Willingham transcript, supra note 266, at 255.
There are two problems here. First, the fire scene did not exhibit multiple origins, according to
independent experts. DOUGLAS CARPENTER ET AL., REPORT ON THE PEER REVIEW OF THE EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF STATE OF TEXAS V. CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM AND STATE OF
TEXAS V. EARNEST RAY WILLIS 11-12 (2006). Second, even if the fire scene had shown multiple
points of origin, this would not necessarily indicate an intentional fire. LENTINI, supra note 261, at
461-62.
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on a concrete floor277 — were also consistent with an accidental blaze.278 Vasquez
also relied on the presence of “crazed glass,” which are spider-web patterns on the
windows as an indication of arson.279 It was long believed that crazed glass
resulted from a fire that burned fast and hot — i.e., one fueled by a liquid
accelerant. Yet, subsequent research demonstrated that crazing occurs from rapid
cooling when water from fire hoses is sprayed on heated windows.280
In retrospect, the most damning piece of evidence involved one of the
numerous debris samples submitted for laboratory analysis.281 It came from an
area near the front door and was the only sample that tested positive for a
chemical commonly used in charcoal lighter fluids. Nevertheless, this finding can
be explained by the fact that a charcoal grill and lighter fluid were on the front
porch at the time of the fire.282 In fact, the negative results from the other samples
supported Willingham’s case.283
Numerous nationally-recognized experts reviewed the arson testimony
presented at Willingham’s trial and found it seriously flawed. The first
examination of the record by an independent expert was submitted to the governor
and the Board of Pardons and Parole days before Willingham’s execution. It
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Willingham transcript, supra note 266, vol. XI, at 248-49. Fire experts
reviewing the evidence from Willingham’s trial pointed out that “[t]he behavior of concrete in
fires, including the development of various colors, has been extensively studied.” CARPENTER ET
AL., supra note 276, at 18. These experts concluded that there is simply “no scientific basis for
Mr. Vasquez’s statement about the brown discoloration being an indication of the presence of
accelerants.” Id.
278
Vasquez’s testimony also demonstrated other misconceptions. A common one is
that arson fires burn hotter and faster than “normal” fires: “You know, it makes the fire hotter. It’s
not a normal fire.” Willingham transcript, supra note 266, vol. XI, at 249. However, the
temperature of burning wood and burning gasoline are nearly identical, so to claim that a fire using
liquid accelerants burns “hotter” than a wood fire is wrong. LENTINI, supra note 254, at 465.
279
“The pieces of broken window glass on the ledge of the north windows to the
northeast bedroom disclosed a crazed ‘spider webbing’ condition. This condition is an indication
that the fire burned fast and hot.” CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 278, at 18 (citing Vasquez’s
written report on the Willingham fire at 4).
280
LENTINI, supra note 261, at 439 (“It is unclear why anyone ever thought that
crazing of glass indicated rapid heating.”).
281
In closing argument, the defense counsel referred to a “dozen samples.”
Willingham transcript (vol. XIII), supra note 266, at 20.
282
Id. at 15 (although photographs show a grill, Vasquez apparently did not know
of the grill’s presence); id. at 16 (acknowledging that a fire-damaged charcoal lighter fluid
container was found on the front porch).
283
The prosecutor would later say that he “‘never did understand why they weren’t
able to recover’ positive tests in these parts.’” Grann, supra note 265, at 61. At trial, he argued
that the “liquid burned away in that destructive madness created by Cameron Todd Willingham.”
Willingham transcript, supra note 266, vol. XIII, at 45.
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concluded: “On first reading, a contemporary fire origin and cause analyst might
well wonder how anyone could make so many critical errors in interpreting the
evidence.”284 Nevertheless, a stay was denied, and Willingham was put to death.
Subsequent evaluations agreed that the trial evidence was junk science. For
example, five independent experts prepared a forty-three page report, finding that
“each and every one of the indicators relied upon have since been scientifically
proven to be invalid.”285
In May 2006, the Innocence Project petitioned the Texas Forensic Science
Commission (TFSC) to review the arson testimony in Willingham’s and Ernest
Ray Willis’ cases.286 The TFSC is not authorized to determine guilt or innocence.
Instead, the Innocence Project argued that the State Fire Marshall Office should
have reinvestigated arson cases in which its experts testified after NFPA 921 was
published in 1992 — a full twelve years before Willingham’s execution.287 TFSC
retained its own independent consultant, Dr. Craig Beyler, another nationallyrecognized expert, to review the arson evidence. His fifty-one page report
dissected the expert testimony, concluding:
The investigations of the Willis and Willingham fires did not comport
with either the modern standard of care expressed by NFPA 921, or the
standard of care expressed by fire investigation texts and papers in the
period 1980-1992. The investigators had poor understandings of fire
science and failed to acknowledge or apply the contemporaneous
understanding of the limitations of fire indicators. Their methodologies
did not comport with the scientific method or the process of elimination.
A finding of arson could not be sustained based upon the standard of care
expressed by NFPA, or the standard of care expressed by fire investigation
texts and papers in the period 1980-1992.288
Once Beyler’s report became public, a political firestorm erupted, and the
284

Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, In re Cameron Todd Willingham, Trial Court No.
24, 4670(B), District Court, 366th Jud. Dist., Navarro County, Tex., Feb. 13, 2004.
285
CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 282.
286
The expert evidence in both cases was comparable, but Willis was lucky. His
death penalty conviction was overturned on procedural grounds, and the prosecutor subsequently
refused to reindict him after Dr. Hurst wrote the same type of critical report in Willis’s case that he
had written in Willingham’s. Willis, who had spent seventeen years on death row, was
subsequently exonerated on actual innocence grounds. See Mary Alice Robbins, New-York Based
Innocence Project Attacks Texas Arson Convictions, 22 TEX. LAWYER, May 8, 2006.
287
See Letter from Innocence Project to Texas Forensic Science Comm’n (Aug. 20,
2010).
288
CRAIG L. BEYLER, ANALYSIS OF THE FIRE INVESTIGATION METHODS AND
PROCEDURES USED IN THE CRIMINAL ARSON CASES AGAINST EARNEST RAY WILLIS AND CAMERON
TODD WILLINGHAM, Aug. 17, 2009, at 51 (emphasis added).
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governor, who was in the midst of a reelection battle, abruptly replaced
commission members three days before a meeting scheduled to consider the
Beyler report.289 The newly-appointed chair, a prosecutor, promptly cancelled the
meeting,290 raising the specter of a cover-up.291 Next, the Attorney General issued
an opinion ruling that the TFSC lacked jurisdiction over cases decided before its
creation.292 The State Fire Marshall vigorously defended its investigation.
The TFSC eventually produced a report — one that did not directly deal
with the Willingham and Willis cases. Nevertheless, the report’s
recommendations and statements indicated that the Willingham arson
investigation was seriously flawed. Its first recommendation was “that fire
investigators adhere to the standards of NFPA 921.”293 In addition, the report
reviewed a number of arson indicators that were used in the Willingham and
Willis cases. Citing Vasquez’s testimony, the report undermined his opinions
concerning (1) V-patterns as an indicator of origin, (2) pour patterns, (3) low/deep
burning, (4) multiple separate points of origin, (5) spalling, (6) burn intensity, and
(7) crazed glass.294 It also observed that “testimony, such as Vasquez’s response
to a question regarding Willingham’s state of mind, is an example of the type of
testimony that experts should avoid as falling outside of their field of
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See Christy Hoppe, Perry Defends Removing 3: He Says He’s Following
Protocol, but Critics Believe He’s Derailing Arson Inquiry, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2,
2009, at 3A; Mary Alice Robbins, Fired Up: Changes Sought for Texas Forensic Science
Commission at Center of Heated Controversy, 25 TEX. LAWYER, Nov. 9, 2009 (“[Former
Commissioner] Levy says he believes ‘things went south’ for the commission after [former Chair]
Bassett released Beyler’s report to the public in August ‘as he was required by law to do.’”). The
meeting was scheduled for October 2, 2009.
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Hoppe, supra note 289 (noting that the new chair was “known as one of the
toughest law-and order prosecutors in the state”).
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See Jennifer Emily, Texas Forensic Science Commission Refuses to End Inquiry
into Willingham Arson Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 2010 (“Perry’s replacements
were seen by some as a political maneuver intended to change the outcome of the commission’s
decision.”); Christy Hoppe, Perry Ousts Officials Before Arson Hearing: He’s Assailed as New
Chair Delays Session on Flawed Case that Led to Execution, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 1,
2009, at 1A; David Mann, Fire and Innocence, TEX. OBSERVER, Dec. 3, 2009 (“Then in late
September, Perry booted three members off of the Texas Forensic Science Commission, which was
investigating the Willingham and Willis cases, just three days before a crucial hearing on
scientists’ findings. Perry’s new appointees promptly canceled the hearing and have yet to
reschedule it. Even conservative commentators cried cover-up, suggesting that Perry, in a tough
battle for re-election, was trying to subvert an investigation that might prove he oversaw the
execution of an innocent man.”).
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Letter from Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General, to Texas Forensic Science
Comm’n (Aug. 2011).
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REPORT OF THE TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMM’N, WILLINGHAM/WILLIS
INVESTIGATION 39 (April 15, 2011).
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Id. at 21-28.
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expertise.”295 The report even encouraged lawyers to “aggressively pursue
admissibility hearings in arson cases.”296
3. Han Tak Lee Case
Unfortunately, Willingham’s case was not an outlier. In the 1989 trial of
Han Tak Lee,297 the expert also relied on the old “myths” to declare the fire
incendiary: (1) greater intensity and heat, (2) burn patterns, (3) alligatoring, (4)
melted metal in bed frames, and (5) crazed glass.298 In addition, the investigation
was “hobbled by an incomplete and inaccurate understanding” of flashover. After
serving twenty-five years, Lee was released from prison in 2015.299
3. National Fire Protection Association Guidelines
After the publication of NFPA 921 in 1991, the kind of testimony
presented in the Willingham and Lee cases should have vanished from the
courtroom. But arson investigators balked. According to one expert, “[t]he initial
response to NFPA 921 in the fire investigation community was overwhelmingly
negative.”300 Babick v. Berghuis301 is illustrative. In that case, Andrew Babick
was convicted of arson-murder for a 1995 house fire and was sentenced to two
terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He later sought
habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial
misconduct. In 2010, the Sixth Circuit rejected these claims.
However, in dissent, Judge Merritt chastised the defense attorney for not
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Id. at 36.
Id. at 48.
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Lee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in 2010, based in part on “inaccurate
and unreliable evidence.” Han Tak Lee v. Tennis, No. 4:CV-08-1972, 2010 WL 3812160, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2010). Although the district court denied Lee’s petition, the Third Circuit
reversed. Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 407-08 (3d Cir. 2012) (“If Lee’s expert’s
independent analysis of the fire scene evidence — applying principles from new developments in
fire science — shows that the fire expert testimony at Lee’s trial was fundamentally unreliable,
then Lee will be entitled to federal habeas relief on his due process claim.”).
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Han Tak Lee v. Tennis, Civil No. 4:08–CV–1972, 2014 WL 3894306 (M.D. Pa.
June 13, 2014) (magistrate report), aff’d sub. nom., Han Tak Lee v. Houtzdale, 798 F.3d 159 (3d
Cir. 2015).
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Mark Hansen, Badly Burned: Long-Held Beliefs About Arson Science Have
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(Dec. 2015).
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Id.
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620 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2010). See generally Marc Price Wolf, Habeas Relief
from Bad Science: Does Federal Habeas Corpus Provide Relief for Prisoners Possibly Convicted
on Misunderstood Fire Science?, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. TECH. 213 (2009).
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contesting the arson evidence in “this strange junk science case.”302 One
prosecution expert testified that: (1) char marks on the porch were evidence of an
accelerant, (2) a “line of demarcation” in a burn pattern on a carpet was
“suspicious” because “it should not have burned the carpeting on these jagged
edges,” and (3) the burns were “not normal” and were “unnatural.”303 Another
prosecution expert stated that “low burning” and other “unnatural” patterns
indicated the presence of an accelerant. Both experts “testified — in direct
contrast to the NFPA guide — that they were so confident in their reading of burn
patterns that the absence of any laboratory confirmation of accelerant had no
effect on their testimony.”304
4. Dog-sniff Evidence
More alarming, in Judge Merritt’s view, was dog-sniff evidence. The
NFPA guide provides: “Research has shown that canines have been alerted to
pyrolysis products that are not produced by an ignitable liquid” and a positive
canine alert without laboratory confirmation “should not be considered
validated.”305 The lab tests had not detected accelerants in the house debris. Yet,
a dog handler testified that “his dog, Samantha, was ‘1000 times’ more effective
at detecting fire starters or liquid accelerants than a laboratory test on burnt
material.”306 In short, the “jury was misled into trusting Samantha over the arson
forensic lab.”307
A more recent arson-dog case involved James Hebshie, who was
convicted of arson and mail fraud in 2006. A federal district court granted his
habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.308 In the
court’s view, had a Daubert hearing been requested on the canine evidence, there
was a “‘reasonable probability’ that the Court would have excluded the canine
testimony or severely limited it.”309 Without a challenge from the defense, the dog
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620 F.3d at 580.
Id. at 581 (quoting transcript).
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Id.
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NFPA 921, supra note 263, § 16.5.4.7 (describing the role of canine
investigations as “assisting with the location and collection of samples” for laboratory testing).
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Babick, 620 F.3d at 580.
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Id. See also United States v. Myers, No. 3:10–00039, 2010 WL 2723196
(S.D.W.Va. July 8, 2010) (granting motion in limine to prohibit expert testimony of a canine
handler because the alert had not been confirmed by lab testing, conflicted with the Fire Guide,
and did not meet the Daubert standards).
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United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2010).
309
Id. at 124.
303
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handler testified that his dog (Billy) was 97% accurate.310 Indeed, the handler
testified to “an almost mystical account of Billy’s powers and her unique olfactory
capabilities.”311 The court explained: “[The handler] went on and on about what
he understood about Billy, as if his relationship with Billy somehow enhanced the
reliability and probative value of the results — that she was unique, that he could
‘read her face,’ that he was with her 365 days a year, that he knew her personality,
‘the way her eyes shifted,’ the ways her ear shifted, etc.”312
The handler focused on one area as the origin of the fire and testified that
the dog had not alerted anywhere else on the premises. However, the handler had
limited the dog’s access to that one area. In addition, a dog’s failure to alert has
no evidential value: “[T]he scientific literature cast doubt on the significance of
the dog’s failure to alert (false negatives) and even raised concerns about canine
‘proficiency’ testing, concerns counsel never raised.”313 Indeed, the term
“accelerant-detection” dog was misleading because the dog is trained to alert to
many common materials that are not accelerants; the site of the fire was a
convenience store which sold lighter fluid and lighters.
5. Post-Daubert Cases
The courts’ response to bogus arson evidence is mixed.314 It is not hard to
find cases citing discredited arson indicators after Daubert, such as pour patterns
or puddle configurations,315 melted bedsprings,316 concrete spalling,317 fire load,318
310

See Michael E. Kurtz et al., Effect of Background Interference on Accelerant
Detection by Canines, 41 J. FORENSIC SCI. 868 (1996) (discussing the varying levels of reliability
in accelerant detection depending on the substance in question and the canine handler); see also
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Ark. 2000) (affirming the trial court’s
exclusion of a canine handler who sought to testify about “the alleged superior ability of his canine
partner, Benjamin, to detect the presence of accelerants after a fire . . . [,that he could] discriminate
between different types of chemicals,” and that he had an accuracy rate of “100%”).
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Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
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Id. at 119.
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Id. at 94.
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1 GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 15, at 1102-03 (“Many appellate cuts continue to
routinely accept investgigors’ tstimoy about experientaillly base generalizations.) (citing cases).
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See, e.g., State v. Allen, No. 22835, 2009 WL 2096295 ¶ 114 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009) (investigator testifying to “an irregular burn pattern on the floor which through all my
experience and training it appears to be an irregular pour patterns [sic], an ignitable liquid pour
pattern”); State v. Wolf, 891 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (A firefighter testified “that he
observed ‘pour patterns’ located on the floor throughout the mobile home; that the pour patterns
are burnt marks that look like puddles that result from ignitable liquids . . . being poured out of
containers . . . .”); Colburn v. State, 990 So. 2d 206, 209-10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (“This pour
pattern, [the fire investigator] explained, was indicative of flammable liquid being poured in the
area . . .. On cross-examination [the fire investigator] did admit that the State Crime Laboratory
was unable to identify ignitable liquids in the three debris samples taken from the pour pattern
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and “fast and hot” burn.319 Decided in 1998, Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v.
Benfield320 is considered the “first serious challenge to the ‘old school’ of fire
investigators.”321 In that case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that arson testimony “is
subject to Daubert’s inquiry regarding the reliability of such testimony”322 and
cited NFPA 921.323 Yet, a 2011 article on the subject began with the passage:
“Fire researchers have shattered dozens of arson myths in recent years. So why do
American courts still lag behind?”324 And a 2013 survey of 586 public sector fire
investigators found that some myths endure: “Nearly 40 percent did not know
that crazed glass is caused by rapid cooling, not rapid heating. Twenty-three
percent think puddle-shaped burns indicate the use of an accelerant. Eight percent
still believe that alligator blistering implies that a fire burned fast and hot.”325
***

area.”); State v. Henderson, 125 P.3d 1132, 1137 (Mont. 2005) (finding that the trial court “did not
err in allowing [a firefighter] to identify in the photographs and diagrams the pour patterns he had
observed at the scene”).
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Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d 407, 409 (Miss. 1993), vacated, Simon v.
Mississippi, 513 U.S. 956 (1994).
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See, e.g., State v. Amodio, 915 A.2d 569, 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
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Life Ins. Co., 698 So. 2d 89, 95 (Miss. 1997) (“The arson investigator … testified that he found
five different areas of spalling and concluded arson to be the cause of the fire.”).
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investigator “deduced there must have been an accelerant or some kind of extra fuel load.”).
319
See, e.g., People v. Klait, No. 06-000399-FH, 2010 WL 2076956, at *5 (Mich.
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The Texas Forensic Science Commission’s report did more than the courts
to curb flawed arson testimony. Moreover, the number of ineffective assistance of
counsel cases, such as Babick and Hebshie, exposed another glaring defect in the
criminal justice system’s capability to evaluate expert testimony. For example, in
Richey v. Bradshaw,326 the Sixth Circuit wrote: “The scientific evidence of arson
was thus fundamental to the State’s case. Yet Richey’s counsel did next to
nothing to determine if the State’s arson conclusion was impervious to attack.”327
Similarly, in Dugas v. Coplan,328 the First Circuit criticized counsel because his
“investigation consisted of his own visual assessment of the fire scene, his
conversations with the state’s experts, some limited reading, and his conversations
with other defense attorneys after work.”329 Then, without consulting an arson
expert, he mounted a “not arson” defense.
III. FORENSIC SCIENCE RESEARCH
By now it is almost a truism that too many forensic disciplines are not
grounded in science — and yet their adherents continue to claim the mantle of
science. The NAS report emphasized the “notable dearth of peer-reviewed,
published studies establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic
methods.”330 Indeed, the co-chair of the NAS committee, Judge Harry Edwards,
later stated: “I think that the most important part of our Committee’s Report is its
call for real science to support the forensic disciplines.”331 Not surprisingly, the
report triggered extensive commentary.332 One cataloged the numerous ways in
which forensic science has failed to develop a research culture333 and argued that
the “core values” of a scientific culture “are empiricism, transparency, and an
ongoing critical perspective.”334 Another article documented the serious problems
that have arisen when the law enforcement controls forensic research.335
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The NAS report recommended the creation of an independent federal
entity (the National Institute of Forensic Sciences) to oversee the field, including a
research agenda.336 If adopted, this proposal would have wrest control of forensic
science from law enforcement. According to the report, some federal entities
were “too wedded” to the status quo and “have failed to pursue a rigorous
research agenda to confirm the evidentiary reliability of methodologies used in a
number of forensic science disciplines.”337 As a result, these “agencies are not
good candidates to oversee the overhaul of the forensic science community.”338
Unfortunately, Congress did not act on this recommendation.
A.

National Commission on Forensic Science (2013-17)

To its credit, the DOJ, in partnership with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), established the National Commission on
Forensic Science in 2013. The commission’s task was to enhance the practice and
improve the reliability of forensic science.339 Early on, the commission created a
subcommittee on scientific inquiry and research, which undertook the task of
reviewing bibliographies of foundational literature that had been compiled by
various forensic disciplines.340 The subcommittee quickly concluded that even a
“cursory review” of the bibliographies raised serious concerns. One basic
problem involved the definition of foundational literature. According to the
subcommittee, “[i]n some cases, it was unclear which literature citations are
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Id. at 18.
338
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crucial to support the foundation of a particular forensic discipline.”341 This
finding led the subcommittee to define the term: foundational, scientific literature
should consist of “original research, substantive reviews of the original research,
clinical trial reports, or reports of consensus development conferences.”342
Tellingly, the subcommittee felt compelled to add: “While other forms of
dissemination of research and practice (e.g., oral and poster presentations at
meetings, workshops, personal communications, editorials, dissertations, theses,
and letters to editors) play an important role in science, the open, peer-reviewed
literature is what endures and forms a foundation for further advancements.”343
The subcommittee’s second concern was that “some of the cited literature
had not undergone a rigorous peer-review process.”344 Peer review by other
members of a forensic discipline is not sufficient.345 Many of the reviewers are
not scientists, and there is the problem with role bias. According to the
subcommittee, foundational research should be subjected to “rigorous peer review
with independent external reviewers to validate the accuracy . . . [and] overall
consistency with scientific norms of practice”346 and “published in a journal that is
searchable using free, publicly available search engines.”347 With few exceptions,
the disciplines considered above have not satisfied these requirements.348
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Another recommendation, one on technical merit, provides: “All forensic
science methodologies should be evaluated by an independent scientific body to
characterize their capabilities and limitations in order to accurately and reliably
answer a specific and clearly defined forensic question.”349 Significantly, the
commission recommended that the NIST be the independent scientific evaluator
within the justice system.
B.

White House PCAST Report (2016)

Unlike the commission, which had a broad mandate, the White House
PCAST report focused only on the validation issue. It took pains to explain the
concept of validation, noting that forensic methods must be based on empirical
studies and be “repeatable, reproducible, and accurate, at levels that have been
measured and are appropriate to the intended application.”350 The report
recognized that forensic methods may be either objective or subjective.
Foundational validity for objective methods “can be established by studying [and]
measuring the accuracy, reproducibility, and consistency of each of its individual
steps.”351 By definition, this approach is not possible with subjective techniques

• Is the scope of the article clearly stated as appropriate (article, case study, review,
technical note, etc.)?
• Is the literature review current, thorough, and relevant to the problem being studied?
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• Are the results and conclusions reasonable and defensible based on the work and the supporting
literature?
• Are the citations and references complete and accurate?
• Are the references original (primary) and not secondary?
• Are funding sources and other potential sources of conflict of interest clearly stated?
349
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because they involve significant human judgment. Consequently, validity and
reliability for these methods must be based on “black-box studies” (as if a “black
box” is in the examiner’s head), in which numerous examiners make decisions on
many independent tests in order to determine error rates.352
Importantly, the report also specified what does not qualify as validation:
“experience, judgment, good professional practices (such as certification
programs and accreditation programs, standardized protocols, proficiency testing,
and codes of ethics) cannot substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity
and reliability.”353 Moreover, expressions of confidence by individual examiners
or a consensus among practitioners about the accuracy cannot substitute for “error
rates estimated from relevant studies.” In sum, empirical evidence is the “sine qua
non” for establishing foundational validity.354
PCAST also recommended that NIST conduct scientific evaluations of the
validity of current and new forensic technologies: “To ensure the scientific
judgments are unbiased and independent, such evaluations should be conducted
by an agency which has no stake in the outcome.”355
In response, DOJ released a statement criticizing the report — on the day
of its release. According to DOJ, the PCAST report “does not mention numerous
published research studies which seem to meet PCAST’s criteria for appropriately
designed studies providing support for foundational validity. That omission
discredits the PCAST report as a thorough evaluation of scientific validity.”356
PCAST, in turn, invited all stakeholders to identify validity studies that it might
have overlooked. “DOJ ultimately concluded that it had no additional studies for
PCAST to consider.”357 Nor did the more than 400 papers submitted by twentysix respondents cause PCAST to change its positions. The bottom line remained:
“In science, empirical testing is the only way to establish the validity and degree
352
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of reliability of such an empirical method. Fortunately, empirical testing of
empirical methods is feasible. There is no justification for accepting that a
method is valid and reliable in the absence of appropriate empirical evidence.”358
However, most prior studies use “closed-set design.” In these studies, “the correct
source of each questioned sample is always present; studies using the closed-set
design have underestimated the false-positive and inconclusive rates by more than
100-fold.”359
IV. CONCLUSION
This article examined the courts’ systemic failure in criminal cases to
fulfill its “gatekeeper”360 function under Daubert. The courts, of course, function
as part of a justice system that relies on attorneys to discredit erroneous or
overstated testimony. According to the Daubert Court, “[v]igorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence.”361 After the release of the NAS report, some
commentary focused on defense counsel’s incompetence: “Criminal defense
lawyers . . . are supposed to be the people who recognize bogus expert claims,
challenge them, move to get them excluded, and undermine those that survive
exclusion by knowledgeable, thorough, and telling cross-examination. On the
whole, they don’t do any of these things very well.”362 Judge Nancy Gertner, one
of the rare jurists willing to take Daubert seriously, agreed,363 writing that “the
NAS Report’s concerns will not be fully met until advocacy changes.”364
A 2009 study of the cases of 137 convicts exonerated by DNA profiling
revealed that “[d]efense counsel rarely made any objections to the invalid forensic
science testimony in these trials and rarely effectively cross-examined forensic
analysts who provided invalid science testimony.”365 One commentator summed
it up this way:
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Unlike the extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal
defendant’s challenge is usually perfunctory. Even when the most
vulnerable forensic sciences — hair microscopy, bite marks, and
handwriting — are attacked, the courts routinely affirm admissibility citing
earlier decisions rather than facts established at a hearing. Defense
lawyers generally fail to build a challenge with appropriate witnesses and
new data. Thus, even if inclined to mount a Daubert challenge, they lack
the requisite knowledge and skills, as well as the funds, to succeed.366
In sum, the courts were not solely responsible for Daubert’s failure.
Defense attorneys also bear responsibility. There are limits, however, to what can
be expected of overburdened and chronically underfunded public defenders when
dealing with expert testimony. Better training for defense counsel (which is
sorely needed) is not sufficient. Similarly, access to defense experts (also sorely
needed) will not be adequate.367 Defense experts can challenge prosecution
experts’ methods and opinions but do not have the funds to conduct foundational
research, nor to act as an independent evaluator of foundational research on an
ongoing basis. The justice system is incapable of providing this expertise. An
alternative paradigm is needed.
An independent scientific review is required. NAS has published the most
authoritative and independent reviews of forensic science. In addition to the
forensic report, NAS has issues report on sound spectrometry (“voiceprints”),368
two DNA reports,369 polygraph testing,370 and bullet lead analysis.371 But NAS is
not a governmental entity, and its work is depends on funding. The justice system
needs scientific expertise on a continuing basis — and thus institutionalized.
The National Commission’s proposal, endorsed by PCAST, tasked NIST
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with the responsibility of evaluating forensic disciplines on an ongoing basis.372 It
should be adopted. NIST has the expertise and independence for this task and has
been increasingly involved in forensic research. There would be a cost, but
litigating validity issues across the country at Daubert and Frye hearings also has
a cost. Moreover, there is a significant expense associated with rectifying past
mistakes that occurred with hair,373 bullet lead,374 DNA,375 and arson cases.
Unfortunately, the Attorney General did not even renew the commission’s
charter in April 2017.376 Instead, he appointed a forensic science working group
within the DOJ — headed by a prosecutor instead of a scientist.377 The
independent scientists on the commission objected to this action, writing:
The Justice Department now proposes to improve forensic science
by moving its oversight and development to an office within the
department. This is precisely the opposite of what was recommended by
the National Academy of Sciences report and the NCFS. It is a step
backwards, because it reinforces the conditions that contributed to the
current problems, namely, placing this discipline within the control of law
enforcement and prosecutors. The Justice Department is home to many
dedicated public servants including scientists whose passion for justice is
unquestioned. However, DOJ is not a scientific body, and it is difficult to
see how forensic science can become a true science in that environment.
Science flourishes when free and independent; only then can the tools and
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technology that it creates be truly reliable.378
The American Association for the Advancement of Science concurred, also
stressing that independence “cannot be overstated.”379
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